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ABSTRACT 
 
FELIPE DE BRIGARD: Reconstructing Memory 
(Under the direction of Jesse J. Prinz) 
 
According to the received view, memory is a cognitive system the function of 
which is to store, preserve, and accurately retrieve personal-level representations of past 
experiences. Philosophers who hold this view typically explain cases of false memories 
either as mental events that are not produced by memory or as the product of a memory 
system that is malfunctioning. However, research in the cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience of false memory presents a challenge to this view, as it strongly suggests 
that memory distortion is not only a common and pervasive phenomenon but also the 
result of a well-functioning memory. In my dissertation I argue that in order to make 
sense of this evidence, we need to reject the received view.  In particular, I argue that 
remembering isn’t the retrieval of personal-level perceptual representations, but rather the 
reconstruction of incomplete sub-personal level sensory representations. Also, I argue 
that the content of our memories is not carried by a single representation that is preserved 
through time—a memory trace. I offer instead an account of memory traces according to 
which they are dispositional properties of neural networks to recreate the mental situation 
one was in during the original perception.  
 iv 
In fleshing out what this particular disposition actually is, remembering is then 
explained not as the retrieval of a stored mental representation but rather as the act of 
reconstructing the mental situation one was in during the original perception by filling-in 
incomplete sub-personal memory traces. This analysis leads me to argue in favor of a 
view of remembering in which being aware of the content of a memory consists in 
covertly attending to a reactivated sensory representation. The final claim I argue for has 
to do with memory’s function: I suggest that memory is not for the reproduction of stored 
mental representations. Instead, remembering is a sub-operation of a larger cognitive 
system the function of which is to produce probable episodic counterfactual thoughts—
thoughts of what could have likely happened in the past—in the service of guiding and 
regulating our thoughts about what may happen in the future.  
 v 
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1. Introduction 
 
 One hundred years ago, psychology and philosophy professor G.F. Stout defined 
memory in his influential “A Manual of Psychology” as the revival of ideas, insofar as it 
is “merely reproductive, and does not involve transformation of what is revived in 
accordance with present conditions”. Furthermore, he claimed that such revival “requires 
the objects of past experiences to be re-instated as far as possible in the order and manner 
of their original occurrence” (Stout, 1915: 575). After a century of scientific research we 
now know that such an account is most likely false or, at best, imprecise. 
Anthropological, psychological and neurological evidence strongly suggests that memory 
is not a reproductive but a highly reconstructive process, which is critically dependent 
upon current conditions of recall, and susceptible to several kinds of distortions, many of 
which do not respect the order or the manner of their original occurrence. Surprisingly, 
philosophy has been largely insensitive to this evidence. Given the pivotal role that 
memory plays in our mental life, and given the recurrence with which memory features in 
many philosophical theories, this is a serious oversight.  Reconsidering memory under the 
light of such evidence has significant—even surprising—repercussions for philosophy. 
Exploring some of these repercussions is the main purpose of my dissertation. 
 According to the traditional philosophical view—very much in line with Stout’s—
memory is regarded, first, as a cognitively isolated faculty: it can either send or receive 
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information from low-level (e.g., perception) and high-level systems (e.g., reasoning). As 
such, no part of the system of memory is shared by any other system; when memory gets 
damaged all other systems remain unaffected. Second, many supporters of this view 
assume that remembering is a propositional attitude. From this perspective, remembering 
is understood in terms of a subject relating to a proposition—whether intra- or extra-
mental—with the right memorial attitude. Finally, the traditional view holds that memory 
is primarily reproductive, and that its function is to recapitulate the past as faithfully as 
possible. Therefore, according to the traditional view, to falsely remember something—as 
when we mistake a memory for an imagination—should be regarded as a case of 
memory’s malfunction. In contrast, I defend a view according to which memory is not an 
isolated, but an integrated system; it shares some of its essential components with other 
cognitive systems, predominantly perception, attention, and imagination. Second, I claim 
that memory isn’t reproductive. While a memory experience phenomenologically 
presents to the subject as the re-instatement of a previous event, in reality there is nothing 
that is literally brought back to mind. Third, I argue that remembering shouldn’t be 
understood as a relation between a subject and a proposition, and that the content of our 
(episodic) memories aren’t propositional. Finally, I argue that instead of thinking of cases 
of false memories as failures of memory, the pervasiveness of this phenomenon is better 
explained by a theory according to which memory’s function is not that of faithfully 
remembering the past but rather of flexibly using the perceptual components of past 
experiences to build personal counterfactuals (i.e. thoughts of what could have happened 
in my past) in the service of episodic foresight (i.e. images of what may happen to me in 
the future).  
 3 
 The philosophy of memory is sharply divided when it comes to answering the 
question about what we remember when we remember. Two answers have been 
traditionally suggested. The first of these views is known as representationalism. It 
claims that what you remember is a mental representation whose content is the past 
event. When you remember your first kiss, for instance, what you are aware of is not the 
event of kissing someone per se, but rather a mental representation depicting such an 
event. This retrieved mental representation is identical to—or it is caused by—a memory 
trace left by the original experience. In contrast to this view is direct or naive realism, 
which suggests that what you are aware of when you remember your first kiss is not a 
mental representation of any sort, but rather the event itself—just as you are aware of an 
object itself, not a mental representation, when you perceive it directly. Direct realists 
have put forth a number of arguments against the claim that remembering involves 
memory traces. In the second chapter I tackle one of these prominent arguments, and I 
offer reasons to believe that memory traces are real and that they play a necessary role in 
the explanation of recollection.  
However, unlike traditional representationalists, I don’t believe that a memory 
trace is tantamount to the personal-level representation one is aware of when 
remembering. Memory traces should not be understood as mental representations that, 
having been entertained during perception, are put aside in some sort of unconscious 
storehouse waiting to be recovered during recollection. Instead, I claim that memory 
traces are to be understood as multi-level neural mechanisms that acquire the 
dispositional property to reinstate, more or less, the activation state they were in during 
encoding at the time of retrieval. The neural activity that gave rise to the encoded 
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experience is thus reconstructed during retrieval when the appropriate cue triggers the 
right memory trace. As a result, the view I offer in the next chapter blurs the distinction 
between the memory trace left by a particular experience, and the processes of encoding 
and retrieving the memorial content representing that particular experience.  
 Thinking of memory traces in this way invites us to reconsider the nature of the 
intentional content of our memories. As I mentioned, the traditional view considers 
remembering as a propositional attitude. Accordingly, to remember is customarily 
understood as a relation between a rememberer and a proposition conveying the content 
of the memory. In the third chapter I offer two arguments against this perspective. On the 
one hand, I claim that a relational account of remembering encounters certain problems 
when it comes to explaining the way in which propositions figure in our psychological 
explanations. On the other hand, I argue that the content of our memories may not be 
propositional. By this I don’t mean that our memories fail to represent the events they are 
about; they certainly do. However, they do so in a way that suggests degrees of accuracy, 
rather than simply true or false—as it is assumed by partisans of the propositional attitude 
account.   
By rejecting the view that the content of our memories is propositional, I leave 
open at least two distinct and important questions. The first question has to do with joint 
reminiscing. According to the propositionalist view, to be in the same mental state as 
another person is for both of them to entertain the same proposition with the same mental 
attitude. Without propositions, then, how can we explain the pervasive phenomenon of 
joint reminiscing? In the fourth chapter I offer an account of joint reminiscing that 
disposes of propositional contents. The analysis I put forth seeks to explain not only the 
 5 
way in which our brain allows us to retrieve the content of our memories, but also the 
mechanisms by means of which those contents become conscious. Such mechanisms, I 
argue, are essentially attentional mechanisms, and I claim that remembering is 
tantamount to covertly attending to a memorial content. Accordingly, in order for two or 
more people to jointly reminisce about the same memory, they all must be able to 
covertly attend to the same memorial content. 
Finally, the second question left open by my rejection of propositional contents 
from the analysis of remembering concerns the admission of false and distorted memories 
as genuine cases of remembering. The idea that such is the function of memory goes back 
at least to Aristotle (Sorabji, 2006). Notwithstanding such eminent origin, I think this idea 
is partially wrong: if memory were reconstructive and sometimes inaccurate, wouldn’t 
that speak against memory’s function of recording and reproducing the past? In the fifth 
and last chapter, I present a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system 
supporting not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, 
but also what could have been the case. As a result, I argue that the function of memory is 
to permit the flexible recombination of experiences into possible past events that didn’t 
occur, in order to assist in creating mental simulations of possible future events. This 
picture of memory will necessarily force us to reconsider memory’s function. For now 
remembering the past is, at most, only a secondary concern for memory. The advantage is 
that reconstructing memory under this new light eliminates the problem of squaring its 
function with the fact that our memories are sometimes inaccurate. 
  
 
2. The ontological status of memory traces 
 
Doubt about traces is to be dispelled by reference to the sheer  
difficulty of psychological explanation without them. 
(John Sutton, 1988: 300) 
 
1. Introduction 
The notion of memory trace is probably as old as our interest in understanding 
memory. However, questions as to whether such a notion denotes a real entity, and what 
its nature may be, are still a matter of debate in the philosophy and psychology of 
memory. In this chapter I present a model that may help understand the nature of memory 
traces, and I offer an argument in favor of their existence inspired by what has been 
called “experimental realism” (Cartwrtight, 1983; Hacking, 1983). Briefly stated, I 
suggest that memory traces are multi-level neural mechanisms, and I claim that our 
capacity to intervene with their mechanistic operations in order to affect subsequent recall 
gives us epistemic warrant to believe in their existence. 
To that end, I need to show that the question about the reality of memory traces is 
a particular instance—or, at least, that it shares the dialectical structure—of the more 
general debate in the philosophy of science about the reality of the unobservable entities 
supposedly referred to by our theoretical terms. I do that in the second part of this 
chapter, where I claim that arguments in favor of the reality of memory traces are usually 
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inferences to the best explanation (IBE). In particular, I claim that realists about memory 
traces argue that positing memory traces as causal intermediaries between the 
experienced event, Ex, and the subsequent mental state of remembering the event, Rx, 
offers the best explanation as to how Ex causes Rx. On the other hand, anti-realists about 
memory traces suggest that the postulation of memory traces is not required to explain 
how Ex causes Rx. They argue that the main motivation for positing intermediate causal 
traces stems from the realist’s rejection of causal explanations involving action at a 
temporal distance. By way of arguing in favor of causal explanations allowing 
spatiotemporal gaps between cause and effect, anti-realists about memory traces try to 
undercut the main motivation for the postulation of memory traces.  
In the third part, I argue against this anti-realist counter-argumentative strategy, 
not by way of showing that action at a distance is not possible, but rather by suggesting 
that the mere acceptance of action at a distance still does not give us the best possible 
causal explanation for recollection. More specifically, I argue that even if one accepts the 
possibility of causal explanations involving action at a distance, there are still many 
causally related questions about recollection for which that sort of explanation is 
insufficient. I offer instead a model for the causal explanation of recollection using an 
interventionist framework (Woodward, 2003). I explain how such an account would fare 
better than the mere action at a distance account—and, incidentally, than the mere causal 
account—when it comes to many causally relevant questions about recollection. As 
anticipated, this proposed model requires the existence of causally relevant memory 
traces. 
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To substantiate the model, I offer—in the fourth section of this chapter—a 
mechanistic interpretation of the postulated memory traces drawing from recent data in 
the neuroscience of learning and memory. I explain what, according to these empirical 
data, memory traces may be, and how they can behave causally as suggested by the 
interventionist model. Finally, in the fifth and last section, I explain how neuroscientists 
have in fact manipulated, and predict how they can manipulate, memory traces in order to 
produce differential effects in subsequent recollection. This final observation leads me to 
suggest that our capacity to manipulate memory traces gives us reason to believe in their 
existence. 
 
2. Memory traces as theoretical posits 
Although the notion of memory trace is widely used in philosophy of memory, as 
well as in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, there is substantial disagreement as to 
what exactly is meant by it. In its most general form, ‘memory trace’ is used in reference 
to events or processes that exist during a period of time, t2, between a time, t1, in which a 
subject, S, experiences a particular event x, Ex, and a subsequent time, t3, in which S 
remembers or recollects x, Rx. Additionally, some philosophers of memory tend to think 
that in order for something to count as a memory trace, three conditions must obtain: (1) 
the memory trace must play a causal role in the recollection of the event it is a trace of, 
(2) it must retain the mental content entertained during the remembered event, and (3) it 
must be structurally similar or isomorphic to what is remembered (e.g., Malcolm, 1977; 
Bernecker, 2008).  
 9 
Of these conditions, only the first one is relatively uncontroversial. With the 
advent of connectionist models of cognition (e.g., Rumelhart et al., 1986) and the 
discovery that neural networks are constantly redeployed for different cognitive tasks 
(e.g., Anderson, 2010), cognitive scientists have questioned the claim that there is a 
meaningful way of talking about memory traces preserving any sort of mental content—
as opposed to, say, reconstructing it during retrieval (McClelland, 2010). Additionally, 
both philosophers of memory and cognitive scientists doubt that there are either 
conceptual or empirical reasons to believe that even if it makes sense to say that memory 
traces preserve mental contents, they need to do so in a format that, in any interesting 
way, is structurally isomorphic to the remembered experience or event (e.g., Rosen, 
1975). Notwithstanding the importance of these issues, I want to focus on the more 
fundamental question about the very existence of memory traces—a question that, as I 
plan to show, is intimately related to our understanding of condition (1). However, before 
I get there, I want to explore where the question about the existence of memory traces 
comes from. 
 
2.1. Two ways of thinking about the existence of memory traces 
The notion of memory trace predates the distinction between philosophy and 
psychology; indeed, it predates the distinction between philosophy and science. One of 
the first references to memory traces comes from Plato’s Theaetetus, where experiences 
leaving traces in our memory are compared to seal rings leaving impressions in a wax 
table. These impressions—the analogy tells us—are representatives of the seal ring, just 
as memory traces are representatives of the experiences that created them (Plato, 
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Theatetus194 c-e). Philosophical tradition also tells us that Zeno the Stoic and Aristotle 
embraced the view that perception leaves traces, and that such traces give rise to the 
memories we later on recover during recollection (Sorabji, 2006; Gomulicki, 1953). 
Likewise, the appeal to memory traces persists in the views on memory of early modern 
philosophers, like Descartes and Hobbes, as well as in the views of empiricist 
philosophers, like Locke, Hume and Mill. Aside from some notorious skeptics (e.g., 
Reid, 1785/1849), the use of memory traces to explain the phenomenon of recollection 
was so widespread by the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, 
that it became the received view by the time psychology established itself as an 
independent discipline.  
 By the end of the 19th century both philosophers and psychologists seemed to 
agree that, given the current status of neuroscience, memory traces were merely 
hypothetical (Russell, 1921). However, philosophers and psychologists disagreed as to 
how to interpret the precise nature of this hypothesis, and the way one should go about 
verifying it. As a result, the quest for the ontological status of memory traces became the 
object of two different and relatively independent inquiries. On the one hand, 
philosophers saw the postulation of memory traces as a theory-independent hypothesis. 
Memory traces were hypothetical precisely because their acceptance within a theory of 
memory was at stake. As a result, they thought that the first step in order to know 
whether or not there are memory traces was conceptual: one needed to find out whether 
the notion of memory trace was at all required for our correct understanding of memory. 
On the other hand, psychologist thought of memory traces as a theory-dependent 
hypothesis; indeed, they thought of it as a psychophysical hypothesis (James, 1890: 655). 
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From the psychologist’s point of view, memory traces were hypothetical, not because we 
were questioning whether or not they were required at all for a correct account of 
memory, but rather because we just didn’t know what sort of physical—i.e., neural—
entity they could be. As such, psychologists thought that the task of verifying the nature 
of memory traces was an empirical one; it had to do with finding out the nature and 
precise location of memory traces in the brain, not with whether or not we were justified 
in postulating them. Thus, while philosophers like Russell (1921) and Broad (1925) were 
interested in finding out whether or not we required the notion of memory trace in order 
to have a full-fledged analysis of our concept of memory, psychologists like Semon 
(1904/1921)—who coined the term “engram” to refer to memory traces—and James 
(1890) were in the business of devising theories about the biological and physiological 
nature of memory traces. 
 This is not to say that psychologists accepted the existence of memory traces by 
fiat. On the contrary, with the advent of methodological behaviorism, the notion of 
memory trace fell in disrepute (Watson 1930, Skinner 1953). Any mention of ‘memory 
traces’—indeed, any mention of ‘memory’ as opposed to ‘learning’—was practically 
jettisoned from psychological writings, and those who kept searching for the engram 
reached rather pessimistic conclusions. In 1950, Karl Lashley—who was trained as a 
behaviorist by J.B. Watson—published his famous paper In Search of the Engram, in 
which he declared that “it is not possible to demonstrate the isolated localization of a 
memory trace anywhere within the nervous system” (Lashley, 1950). Many interpreted 
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the results therein presented, as well as Lashley’s view, as substantial evidence against 
the existence of memory traces.1   
In the mid-1960s, however, two relatively contemporaneous discoveries 
resurrected psychologists’ hopes for finding memory traces. The first one occurred in 
1957, when Brenda Milner described the case of H.M., an individual who had sustained a 
bilateral resection of the medial temporal lobes, four years earlier, as a result of an 
intractable epilepsy (Scoville & Milner, 1957). The surgery left H.M. completely unable 
to store new information, and it impaired his recollection of recent memories, while 
apparently sparing all other intellectual abilities. This observation strikingly opposed 
Lashley’s views, for it showed that there was a clear dissociation between brain areas that 
were required for the creation of new memories, and the retention of recent ones, and 
brain areas that were not. This important observation confirmed the fact that without a 
hippocampus you simply cannot remember new experiences.  
The second discovery took longer, but it was equally influential. Work in synaptic 
plasticity in hippocampal cells led neurophysiologist to insert a tetanus in the pre-
synaptic membrane in order to increase the speed and the repetition of electrical 
stimulation, which in turn allowed them to extend the life of the electrical signal they 
were recording in the post-synaptic cell. Researchers in Per Andersen’s neurophysiology 
lab in Oslo began to observe what appeared to be a correlation between the frequency and 
duration of the tetanus’ burst in the pre-synaptic cell and the length and enhancement of 
the post-synaptic response, ranging from a few seconds (Green & Adey, 1956) up to 
about ten minutes (Andersen, Bruland & Kaada, 1961). This experimental trick soon 
                                                
1 I believe that a careful examination of Lashley’s work reveal that this interpretation is way out of 
proportion. I am just following the traditional story here. 
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became an object of research in and of itself, as they began to wonder about the 
underlying mechanisms that allowed hippocampal cells to retain their synaptic 
potentiation long after the electric stimulus was removed. The first description of the 
underlying mechanism of this phenomenon, known now as long-term potentiation (LTP), 
was offered by Tim Bliss and Terje Lomo in 1973 (see Craver, 2003). The discovery of a 
neural mechanism that could preserve the effects of a stimulus once removed, and the 
fact that such mechanism happened to be found in a region that was demonstratedly 
necessary for the formation of new memories, gave a new life to the research on memory 
traces. Today, most neuroscientists accept their existence, and the quest for the engram 
remains an active line of research (e.g., Thomson, 2005).  
 
2.2. From causation to memory traces 
For the philosopher, however, these results do not count as evidence until the 
philosophical question about the justification for the postulation of memory traces gets an 
affirmative answer. For, if it doesn’t, there is no reason to believe that neuroscientists are 
justified in taking memory traces to be the sort of entity that can be empirically 
discoverable. And, as it happened, during most of the first half of the 20th century, many 
took the answer to the philosophical question to be in the negative. Russell (1921) and 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) influential views led philosophers to think that our concept of 
memory did not require a reference to the cause of that which is remembered, much less 
to a causal link between the past experience and its subsequent recollection. They thought 
that the inclusion of a causal link between the experience and its subsequent recollection 
was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a successful account of 
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remembering. This view, initially championed by Ryle (1949) and Benjamin (1956), 
found its clearest expression in Malcolm’s Knowledge and Certainty (1963), where he 
emphatically declared that “our use of the language of memory” (p. 237) carries no 
implication about the causes of our remembering or about the causal mechanisms 
involved in our recollections (see also Munsat, 1966). As a result, with no conceptual 
reasons to accept the postulation of memory traces for a correct account of memory, the 
idea that memory traces may in fact refer to something real became a thing of the past. To 
philosophers, neuroscientists were, at best, pursuing will-of-the-wisps. 
However, that same year, Martin and Deutscher’s celebrated paper Remembering 
(1963) put realism about memory traces back on the table. The main purpose of that 
paper was to argue against the claim that a causal condition is not required for a proper 
analysis of our concept of remembering. Their argument is based on cases—some real, 
some imaginary—of people that had a particular experience x at a certain time, t1. Then, 
during some subsequent and arbitrary interval of time, t2, they forget the event. However, 
at a later time, t3, these people do something “for which the only reasonable explanation” 
(p. 176) is that they experienced x at t1. The observation that a causal claim is required in 
order to make sense of their behavior at t3 as a consequence of the experience at t1 
motivates Martin and Deutscher to claim that “if a person’s account of what he saw is not 
due even in part to his seeing it, it cannot be said that he remembers what he saw” 
(Martin & Deutscher, 1963: 175-176). Since the examples Martin and Deutscher discuss 
intuitively fall under our concept of remembering, then they conclude that a person’s 
recollection of x must be due to her having experienced x. Thus, they formulate their 
causal condition for remembering: 
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(CC)  S’s experience of a particular event x, Ex, causes—or, at least, is 
causally relevant to—S’s subsequent recollection of the event, Rx. 
 
There are two points I would like to extract from Martin and Deutscher’s analysis. First, 
their paper brought causation back into the analysis of memory by way of pointing out 
the explanatory indispensability of the causal condition. Unfortunately, this point isn’t 
stressed enough, partly because Martin and Deutscher’s own analysis suggests that CC is 
simply the conclusion of the following modus tollens: 
 
 Argument 1: 
(P1)  If S’s Rx is not caused by Ex, then S is not Rx-ing (Assumption) 
(P2)   But S is Rx-ing (as evidenced by their thought-experiments) 
(C)   Therefore, S’s Rx is caused by Ex. 
 
But notice that this interpretation may render their argument vacuous. As stated, P1 
implies its counterpositive:  
 
 *(P1)  If S is Rx-ing, then S is caused by Ex 
 
which is precisely the conditional they want to prove. But, of course, Martin and 
Deustcher should not want that, for if P1 is supposed to be an assumption, then the 
argument shouldn’t prove what they assumed to begin with.  
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I think a better interpretation is to treat their argument inductively, so that the 
thought-experiments they discuss are to be accommodated by an IBE. Consider one of 
their well-known thought-experiments (Martin & Deustcher, 1963). A painter is asked to 
draw an imagined rural landscape. When he’s done, his parents recognize the painting as 
depicting the view from the house they used to live in many years ago. The painter, who 
has no recollections of the time they lived in such house, claims to have imagined the 
scene he painted. However, the intuition this thought-experiment is supposed to elicit—
and let’s assume that it does for the sake of argument—is that the painter is actually 
painting the scene from memory and not from imagination. Notice that Martin and 
Deuschter’s claim is that we take the painter’s envisioning the scene while painting it as a 
case of remembering (as opposed to imagination) because the “only reasonable 
explanation” for his mentally entertaining that precise scene at t3 is his having 
experienced it at t1, even if he did not remember it at all during t2.  Thus, if we take their 
argument to be an IBE, then CC would enter as the hypothesis that best fits the data 
provided by the thought-experiment. Schematically (Lipton, 1990): 
 
Argument 2: 
(P1)   The painter’s case is clearly an instance of recollection. 
(P2)  The hypothesis CC, if true, would explain why the painter’s case is 
an instance of recollection. 
(P3)  No other hypotheses can explain why the painter’s case is an 
instance of recollection as well as CC does. 
(CC-C) Therefore, CC is (probably) true. 
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If this is the case, then the appeal to CC is the result of an IBE, as opposed to the 
conclusion of a deductively valid argument. 
 The second point I’d like to extract from Martin and Deutscher’s analysis is that 
the existence of memory traces is supposed to follow, as a matter of course, from the 
acceptance of CC (Martin & Deutscher, 1963: 189). Their argument, which is not terribly 
straightforward in their paper, can be reconstructed as follows (see Malcolm 1977):  
 
 Argument 3: 
(P1)  S’s Ex is diachronically separated from S’s Rx.  
(P2)  A cause cannot be diachronically separated from its effect (i.e., 
there is no causation at a temporal distance). 
(MTC)  Therefore, there must be an intermediary causal connection, Mx, 
between Ex and Rx such that Ex is the proximal cause of Mx and 
Mx is the proximal cause of Rx.  
 
So if Mx stands for ‘memory trace of x’, then the memory trace clause (MTC) tells us that 
there are memory traces (see Rosen, 1975, for a similar conclusion). But notice, once 
again, that the argument hinges on an IBE. The idea is that the postulation of memory 
traces as causal intermediaries between Ex and Rx allows us to preserve CC without 
having to accept the metaphysically uncomfortable claim that there is causation at a 
temporal distance. In other words: memory traces become theoretical posits postulated to 
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help explain the causal connection between Ex and Rx without having to accept action at 
a temporal distance. Thus, Malcolm tells us: 
 
Presumably the reader will know that memory traces are not entities, states, or 
processes that neural surgeons have discovered in the course of their investigations 
of the brain, as dentists discover cavities. The memory trace is what may be called 
“a theoretical construct”. It is something that is inferred to exist from the presence 
of things that unquestionably exist, such as learned skills, habits, and occurrences 
of recognition and remembering (Malcolm,1977: 171).  
 
Similarly, John Heil writes: 
 
“It is important to see that the existence of traces is not supported by independent 
psychological or physiological evidence. Traces are postulated just because it is 
thought that their postulation provides an explanation for the phenomenon of 
memory—and perhaps other psychological processes as well. [Memory traces] are 
what once were called theoretical entities, devices introduced in the context of a 
theory to explain some more accessible phenomenon”. (Heil, 1978: 62).  
 
It is worth remarking that, at least for Malcolm, memory traces are postulated in virtue of 
our “abhorrence of ‘action at a distance’—in this case, action at a temporal distance” 
(Malcolm, 1977: 174). Memory traces are conceived as playing the role of “bringing 
about a memory response: [for] without the existence of a trace there would be a gap in a 
causal chain and causal action would occur at a temporal distance” (Malcolm, 1977: 
1979. Emphasis in the original). In sum, the motivation behind the postulation of a 
memory trace as a theoretical posit is the fact that it constitutes a better explanation of 
how Ex causes Rx than the alternative action-at-a-temporal distance account in which Ex 
directly causes Rx.  
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 The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it leaves open the following 
possibility: when it comes to explaining how Rx came about as a result of Ex, an 
explanation involving action at a temporal distance could be at least as good as an 
explanation involving memory traces. This is precisely Norman Malcolm’s important 
move in his Memory and Mind (Malcolm, 1977). His argument, which is reminiscent of 
Russell’s (1921) defense of “mnemic causation”, is that the kind of explanation we 
usually invoke when talking about remembering does not imply, in any way, that there 
should be a process mediating Ex and Rx. Suppose—to use one of his examples—that 
you tell someone that you saw a boat capsize last week. Now imagine that, for whatever 
reason, your interlocutor is in disbelief: ‘How do you know that?’, she asks, to which you 
reply ‘I know because I saw it happen’ (Malcolm, 1977; 183). The thought here is that in 
explaining how it is that you remember the boat capsizing, you are applying a causal 
claim, just as Martin and Deutscher argued, but it makes no reference to any sort of 
causal process or state mediating the event perceived and your recollection of it. As a 
matter of fact, it makes no sense to ask whether you are certain that there was an ongoing 
causal process between your witnessing the boat’s capsizing and your relating the story. 
 
The strange, irrelevant character of this question shows that there is a familiar use 
of causal language consisting of such ordinary locutions as “because of”, “due to”, 
“the cause of”, and the more technical “necessary causal condition”, which carries 
no implication of a causal process filling up the temporal space between the 
occurrence of a cause of x and the occurrence of x. We can agree with Martin and 
Deutscher that the language of memory does, in a sense, require a “causal 
interpretation”, but not agree that memory as a causal concept entails the concept of 
causal process […] Eliminate the assumption of a causal process, and the causal 
argument for a memory trace collapses. (1977: 185). 
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In sum, Malcolm argues that one can accept CC without having to admit the need for 
postulating memory traces. Causal explanations involving action at a temporal distance 
are—according to him—perfectly reasonable explanations for psychological phenomena 
such as remembering, and nothing whatsoever about intermediate causal processes is 
implied by our use of the concept of remembering. While CC may be an IBE as to how 
Ex causes Rx, one does not need to accept the second IBE in which memory traces are 
postulated; explanations involving action at a temporal distance are as good as those 
involving memory traces. In the next section, however, I argue that they are not. 
 
3. Intervening memory 
In the previous section I claimed that the appeal to memory traces stemmed from 
the realization that their postulation was required to come up with the best possible 
explanation as to how Ex causes Rx. After all, the assumption of causally mediating 
memory traces avoided the uncomfortable metaphysical pitfalls of causation at a 
temporal distance. Malcolm’s anti-realist reply, however, was that one could accept the 
claim that Ex causes Rx without having to be committed to causally mediating memory 
traces, simply because explanations involving action at a temporal distance are equally 
good explanations for remembering. As a result, the postulation of memory traces as 
theoretical entities for an adequate account of remembering was thought to be 
unnecessary, and the idea of trying to find them empirically was deemed unwarranted. 
With this move, Malcolm made anti-realism about memory traces, once again, an 
attractive theory in the philosophy of memory.2 
                                                
2 Coincidentally, the idea that memory traces may not be required for a successful explanation of how Rx 
can be brought about by Ex also received some attention in psychology, as it constituted the backbone of 
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Notice, though, that Malcolm is not arguing in favor of the possibility of action at 
a temporal distance as a metaphysical claim. Whether or not a cause can bring about an 
effect after a temporal gap is irrelevant to Malcolm’s argument. His point, just as Martin 
and Deutscher’s, is about causal explanation. After all, he accepts the IBE motivated by 
‘Argument 2’. What he rejects is the IBE motivated by ‘Argument 3’. And he rejects it, 
not because he denies P2 as a metaphysical claim, but rather because he denies that the 
acceptance or rejection of causation at a temporal distance has anything to do with 
successful causal explanations for the phenomenon of recollection.3 In other words, he 
does not think that the postulation of intermediary causal processes adds anything to our 
account of how Rx was brought about as a result of Ex. This, however, is what I think 
Malcolm gets wrong, for I am not sure how explanations involving action at a temporal 
distance can really satisfy our explanatory necessities when it comes to various causally 
relevant questions about memory and remembering. If we only care about experiences 
causing successful recollections, as Martin, Deutscher and Malcolm do, maybe a case can 
be made to the effect that action at a temporal distance is all we need to accept in order to 
furnish satisfactory causal psychological explanations. But successful recollection is not 
the only thing we care about when we demand causal explanations for our memories. We 
often want to know, for instance, why is it that a person, having experienced an event, 
can nonetheless fail to remember it. Additionally, we may want to know why, given that 
a subject experienced a particular event, she only managed to remember part of it, or why 
                                                                                                                                            
the ecological approach to remembering (Gibson, 1979; Turvey & Shaw, 1979; Michaels & Carello, 1981). 
Much of what I say here could easily apply to this view. For a nice criticism of the ecological approach to 
memory, which I find very congenial to the spirit of this paper, see Sutton, 1998, part IV. 
 
3 To put it a la van Fraassen (1980): for Malcolm, an explanation involving action at a temporal distance is 
all one needs to save the phenomenon of recollection, so there is no reason to believe in the reality of the 
intermediary unobservable events supposedly referred by our notion of memory trace. 
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she remembered it distortedly. Moreover, sometimes we wonder whether it is possible to 
facilitate or to hamper our subsequent recollection of an event after having witnessed it. 
To put it succinctly, we often wonder whether it is possible to intervene in the alleged 
causal connection between Ex and Rx.  
Let me offer an analogy to drive my point home. Consider a case in which 
someone consumes cyanide at t1 and then dies at t3. A natural way of describing the event 
is to say that the person died as a result of her consuming cyanide; that the ingestion of 
cyanide caused her death. If all we want to know is why she died at t3, alluding to her 
consuming cyanide at t1 may be a sufficient explanation. The same goes for 
remembering. As I stressed, Malcolm’s examples (as well as Martin and Deutscher’s) 
only pertain to successful recollections of past events. After all, the motivation behind the 
IBE that lead to the acceptance of CC is simply that we cannot make sense of a particular 
successful memory retrieval behavior at t3 unless we accept as its cause having the 
relevant experience at t1. A similar IBE is at work when, upon seeing a dead body 
exhibiting the distinctive signs of cyanide poisoning, a coroner alludes to the person’s 
prior ingestion of cyanide as a causal explanation of his death. In such a case, asking the 
coroner whether or not he’s certain that a causal process was going on between the 
person’s ingestion of the cyanide and his eventual death would seem as awkward as 
asking whether or not you are certain that a causal process was going on between your 
witnessing an event and your relating it afterwards. Here, alluding to your having 
witnessed a boat capsizing—to borrow Malcolm’s own example—may be enough of an 
explanation as to why you remember it, the same way in which alluding to cyanide 
ingestion may be enough of an explanation for the person’s death.  
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But suppose that, right next to the dead body, there is another person who also 
ingested cyanide but failed to die. Let’s assume that she exhibited some of the 
symptoms—shortness of breath and pink skin color—but none of the lethal ones, like 
pulmonary edema and cardiac arrest. Again, in this case, cyanide ingestion can explain 
the person’s symptoms. For example, if someone asks why her skin is pink, one can 
rightly say that it is due to her having ingested cyanide. But then an obvious question 
arises: given that both subjects ingested cyanide, why is it that only one of them died 
while the other failed to die? Now, I take it, talk of intermediary causal processes 
becomes necessary. The only way in which one can explain why, given the same initial 
conditions, one person died while the other person failed to die, is by way of alluding to 
some difference in the causal process that occurred between the cyanide ingestion and the 
subsequent symptomatic behavior. One possibility is that the person who survived had 
increased levels of hydroxocobalamin in her blood due to, say, excessive consumption of 
vitamin B12. As a result, the ingested cyanide preferentially bonded molecules of 
hydroxocobalamin, leaving the hemoglobin’s cytochrome oxidase less affected—which 
would explain why her levels of blood oxygenation were enough to elicit shortness of 
breath and skin coloring but not pulmonary or cardiac arrest. As I discuss below, there 
are other possible explanations. The point, though, is that when it comes to explaining the 
differential effects of cyanide ingestion in these two people, any successful causal 
explanation is going to involve intermediary causal processes. 
The same is true in the case of memory. Consider a small modification of 
Malcolm’s example. Suppose that you weren’t alone when you witnessed the boat 
capsizing. You were with your friend Mary. Both you and Mary were side by side when 
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the event occurred, both of you were looking at the event, and both of you have roughly 
the same visual acuity. However, only you remember the event later on. Now, when you 
wonder why is it that you remember the event while Mary fails to remember the same 
event, even when both of you witnessed it, appealing to an intermediary causal process is 
the natural way to proceed. One may say, for instance, that Mary wasn’t paying attention, 
or that she has a short-term memory problem, or perhaps that she has seen so many boats 
capsizing lately that she cannot remember just that one. Of course, one may allude to 
some more “organic” explanations; one may say, for instance, that Mary was given an 
amnestic drug right after she witnessed the event, or that she suffers from some kind of 
neurodegenerative disease, or even that her medial temporal lobes were damaged at some 
point after having witnessed the boat capsizing. Whatever the story we tell, it is going to 
involve a reference to intermediate causal processes that differed between her case and 
yours.  
Notice that the point I am making does not hinge on our knowledge of the neural 
mechanisms by means of which memories get consolidated and further retrieved—that 
part of the story will come later. My point so far is about the necessity of alluding to 
intermediate causal processes in order to reach the best causal explanation of an 
unsuccessful—versus a successful—case of remembering. In other words, a causal 
explanation that does not make reference to intermediate causal processes won’t be able 
to account for the differential effects between cases of successful and unsuccessful 
recollection. This means that, when it comes to accounting for differential effects during 
recollection, a causal explanation that does not involve intermediate causal processes 
won’t be as good a causal explanation as one involving intermediate causal processes.  
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Thus, Malcolm is wrong when claiming that, when it comes to recollection, explanations 
involving action at a temporal distance are explanatorily on par with those that posit 
intermediate processes. 
To be sure, this argument can also be made when the differential effect involves 
improved—as opposed to impaired—recollection. Suppose that Mary did not fail to 
remember the witnessed event but she actually remembered it better than you did. Unlike 
you, she remembered—let’s say—that there was a red fender on the starboard side when 
the boat capsized. Again, other things being equal, any successful explanation is going to 
involve some reference to intermediate causal processes that differed between you and 
Mary. These processes can be as simple as closely attending to the fender while 
witnessing the event, or as complex as having received a dose of strychnine right after 
seeing the boat capsizing4. I think the same goes for other differential effects, not only 
between subjects but also within subjects. For example, someone may adduce lack of 
sleep when trying to explain why she failed at a particular test that later on, after a good 
night of sleep, she can pass with no trouble. The fact of the matter is that we often allude 
to intermediate causal processes when we offer explanations of differential effects in 
recollection.  
Malcolm is wrong, then, in thinking that causal explanations involving action at a 
temporal distance are explanatorily equivalent to those involving intermediate causal 
processing. He isn’t entirely to blame, though. The root of the problem, I think, lies in 
interpreting CC as stating that a reference to Ex may be a sufficient condition for 
explaining how Rx came about. Martin and Deutscher also share this assumption, for they 
                                                
4 Administering certain chemical compounds such as strychnine during memory consolidation has shown to 
enhance retention in some mammals (e.g., McGaugh & Krivanek, 1970). 
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appeal to memory traces via the second IBE stated in Argument 2—the second premise 
of which Malcolm rejects. But this is the wrong way to introduce memory traces. What 
Martin and Deutscher should have said is that CC and memory traces are a package deal. 
More precisely, what they should have said is that appealing to the past event Ex alone 
does not constitute the best causal explanation for Rx (save, perhaps, in the very 
circumscribed and highly under-described cases of successful recollection that Malcolm 
discusses). The past event is part of the causal explanation5, but on most occasions, as in 
the cases of differential effects just reviewed, the appeal to memory traces is also 
required, not as a fallout of accepting the past event as the cause of Rx, but as a resource 
to explain the psychological effect itself. I suggest, therefore, a causal condition that 
incorporates memory traces: 
 
(CC + MTC) S’s experience of a particular event x, Ex, plus a memory trace of x, 
Mx, cause—or, at least, are causally relevant to—S’s subsequent 
recollection of the event, Rx. 
  
Now, how is it that memory traces become causally relevant when it comes to 
explanations of differential effects in recollection? In order answer this question, I will 
rely on James Woodward’s recent version of a manipulability theory of causation (see 
                                                
5 My argument, so far, implies that Ex is not sufficient for Rx. In chapter 5 I will also claim that, in a certain 
sense, it isn’t necessary either, as there are certain cases of false and distorted memories in which one 
remembers an event that did not occur, or that did not occur exactly as remembered. However, as I explain 
in that chapter, there are certain constraints to this claim, as even for false and distorted memories there is 
still a causal path between Ex and Rx. 
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Woodward 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2003)6. According to his view, causes are considered 
devices for manipulating and controlling effects. Causal explanations explain because 
they convey information about the way in which one could potentially manipulate or 
control a certain effect by intervening on a previous event we take to be its cause. Thus, 
successful causal explanations are used to answer what Woodward (2003) calls what-if-
things-had-been-different questions: “the explanation must enable us to see what sort of 
difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans 
had been different in various possible ways” (Woodward, 2003: 11). In the case of 
cyanide poisoning, for instance, understanding why one person died while the other one 
survived requires understanding what it is that we could have done in the case of the 
person that died to affect the result that occurred in the case of the person who did not 
die. In other words, we want to know whether there was something one could have done 
between t1 and t3 to prevent her death. Might it have been possible that even though she 
ingested cyanide at t1 we could have done something at t2 in order to prevent her death at 
t3?  
As it turns out, there are ways in which one can prevent death by cyanide 
poisoning. For instance, we know that cyanide, when dissolved in water, inhibits 
cytochrome oxidase blocking electron transport, which in turn decreases the amount of 
oxygen in the blood. This condition causes lactic acidosis, whereby the pH of the 
hemoglobin is reduced and it starts building up D-lactate, which rapidly damages organic 
tissue—especially in our lungs and stomach—thus leading to one’s death. As a result, a 
person’s death after ingesting cyanide is potentially preventable at several points during 
                                                
6 Woodward’s view, of course, is not the only view about why casual explanations explain. I will not 
defend his view against the usual contenders, but the reader is welcome to check Woodward & Hitchcock, 
2003a and 2003b, for that purpose.  
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the process. Most typically, one could administer nitrites to turn hemoglobin into 
methahemoglobin, which is preferentially bonded by the cyanide. The bonding of 
cyanide and methahemoglobin creates cyanmethahemoglobin, which in turn can be 
treated with sodium thiosulfate to convert the cyanmethahemoglobin into hemoglobin, 
sulfites, and thiocyanate, the last of which can be secreted through urine without further 
damage to the organism. However, other possible manipulations could be potentially 
implemented, like the use of hydroxocobalamins to artificially increase the pH level in 
the hemoglobin while eliminating the cyanide, or by finding a mechanism to inhibit the 
creation of D-lactate.  
The relevant point is that these interventions—some of which are in fact 
implemented in medical facilities (like the use of nitrites) and some of which are merely 
potential (like the use of some chemical agent that could reduce the hemoglobin’s pH)—
allow us to manipulate the build up of D-lactate. When the levels of D-lactate in the 
blood reach a certain threshold, a body enters into the physiological condition known as 
lactic acidosis, which can be lethal. But if one can reduce the levels of D-lactate, lactic 
acidosis is then prevented and the chances of survival increase. Therefore, according to 
the manipulation account I am relying on, the immediate cause of death in the cyanide 
poisoning case just described is the amount of D-lactate in the person’s blood. We can 
tell that because we know that had we intervened to reduce the level of D-lactate in the 
blood, the person would have merely experienced shortness of breath and skin 
discoloration.  
 
Figure 1: 
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Let me put it graphically. As I described the case above (see figure 1), there are 
two different events, B (death via cardiac arrest) and C (skin discoloration), which 
appeared to have been caused by the same event A (cyanide consumption). However, as I 
argued, if we limit our causal explanation to A, the differential effect would remain 
mysterious. So we wonder whether some other event D happened between the time t1 in 
which A occurred, and the time t3 in which both B and C occurred, such that it could 
explain the differential effect. As it turns out, there is: lactic acidosis. We know that D is 
the cause of B because we can intervene, I, on D and prevent the build up of D-lactate, 
thus manipulating the effect and ‘switching’, as it were, the causal path from B to C 
(figure 2). 
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The same, I surmise, occurs with memory. The suggested variation on Malcolm’s 
case unveils a differential effect between a situation in which one remembers the event 
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(B) and situation in which one does not remember the event (C), despite the fact that in 
both situations one has experienced the initial event (A). As in the case of the cyanide 
poisoning, appealing merely to having witnessed the event does not explain the 
differential effect. So we wonder whether there is an intermediate event, D, such that a 
proper intervention, I, upon it could switch the causal chain from B to C. In other words, 
we want to know whether there is an intermediate causal mechanism that could explain 
why one person remembered or failed to remember a particular event. And we could 
know that with the appropriate intervention. Enter neuroscience.   
 
4. Memory traces as multi-level neural mechanisms. 
In the previous section I argued against Malcolm’s anti-realist view, according to 
which causal explanations for recollection involving action at a temporal distance are at 
least as good as causal explanations of recollection involving causally mediating memory 
traces. I claimed that Malcolm’s anti-realist accounts are unable to explain differential 
effects in recollection. Then I suggested an interpretation of the role of memory traces in 
causal explanations of remembering in terms of Woodward’s manipulability theory of 
causation (2003). Now I would like to suggest a mechanistic model for memory traces 
that can provide a framework for understanding the way in which certain experimental 
manipulations conducted by cognitive neuroscientists have actually produced—and could 
possibly produce—differential effects in recollection. Since this interpretation is largely 
inspired by Craver’s account of multi-level neural mechanisms (Craver 2002, 2007), it is 
useful to explain what he means by such terms. 
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According to Craver, a mechanism is a set of entities and activities arranged in 
specific ways to produce regular changes in a period of time (see Craver 2001; for the 
original formulation, see Machamer et al., 2000). By ‘neural mechanism’, therefore, I 
will refer to the sorts of mechanisms studied in neuroscience. Neural mechanisms 
typically include entities such as neurons, neurotransmitters, oligodendrocites, 
hippocampi, brains, etc. They also include activities such as neuronal firing, enzyme 
release, information processing, brain region activation, etc. The entities and the activities 
composing neural mechanisms have spatial and temporal organizations that are essential 
for the mechanism to perform its operations. Finally, the ways in which the mechanism’s 
entities and activities are organized typically compose hierarchies. Each strata of the 
mechanistic hierarchy is usually called a ‘level’, so mechanisms that can be decomposed 
into more than one level are ‘multi-level mechanisms’ (Craver, 2002; 2007). 
 
Figure 3: 
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As an illustration of a multi-level neural mechanism, consider Craver’s example 
of a mechanistic decomposition of spatial memory in four levels (figure 3). Each level is 
the object of study of a relatively independent sub-discipline in the neurosciences, as each 
level is investigated with a distinctive array of experimental methods. The top level 
includes entities such as organisms (e.g., mice, humans) and surrounding environments, 
as well as activities such as discrimination, button pressing and swimming. At this level, 
experimental psychologists, cognitive ethologists and comparative psychologists study 
spatial memory using experimental methods like the Morris water maze, radial arm 
mazes and virtual reality computers. In the second level (one level down) we find entities 
such as the hippocampus and the enthorrinal cortex, as well as computational activities 
such as informational transfer and spatial map formation. This level is usually studied by 
cognitive neuroscientists and neuropsychologists via experimental methods such as event 
related potentials (ERP), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron 
emission tomography (PET) scans and several diagnosis assessment methodologies often 
implemented in clinical settings. The relevance of the hippocampus and the enthorrinal 
cortex—that is, the entities of the second level—is determined by their dependence on the 
entities and the activities of the third level. This level includes entities such as granule 
and pyramidal cells, and activities such as neuronal firing and depolarization. 
Neurophysiologists and, to some extent, neuroanatomists, study this mechanistic level 
with experimental methods such as intra- and extra-cellular recording, cell body staining, 
track tracing and, sometimes, very localized neuropharmacological interventions, like 
microiontophoresis, whereby the researcher injects small dosages of particular chemical 
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compounds directly into the neural tissue. Finally, the bottom level consists of molecular 
mechanisms that include entities such as N-Methyl D-aspartic (NMDA) receptors and 
Mg2+ ions, and activities such as binding and electron releases. Molecular neurobiologists 
study this level using experimental methods such as pharmacological interventions and 
gene knockouts (Craver, 2002; 2007)  
Although an oversimplification, Craver’s spatial memory example highlights an 
essential feature of any multi-level neural mechanism—including, as I suggest, memory 
traces. Craver calls it mutual manipulability, and it basically specifies a condition of 
sufficiency for a component to be a part of a multi-level mechanism. According to the 
mutual manipulability condition, “a part is a component of a mechanism if one can 
change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by intervening to change the 
component and one can change the behavior of the component by intervening to change 
the behavior of the mechanism as a whole” (Craver, 2007: 141). For example, we can tell 
that LTP in the pyramidal cells in CA1 of a rat’s hippocampus is part of the multi-level 
neural mechanism of the organism’s spatial memory because we can intervene its 
mechanistic operations—by removing NMDA receptors in this location, for instance—
thus inhibiting the activity of the place cells, and making it impossible for the 
hippocampus to form spatial maps. Conversely, we can alter the induction of LTP in CA1 
by way of intervening higher neural levels, e.g., severing afferent neural tracts or 
modifying the rat’s behavior. 
With the conceptual scaffolding of the mechanistic account, we can go back to 
our discussion about the existence of memory traces, and ask whether there is a multi-
level neural mechanism one can intervene upon in order to bring about differential effects 
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in recollection. Since most interventionist techniques in neuroscience are relatively 
new—particularly those that afford controlled manipulations at specific mechanistic 
levels—the precise nature of such a mechanism is currently poorly understood. However, 
a number of experimental results are starting to reveal its structure. First, consider 
manipulations at the molecular level. In a now classic study, Flexner and colleagues 
(1963) injected intracerebrally several kinds of protein synthesis inhibitors in the 
hippocampi of stimuli-conditioned mice. They discovered that graded amounts of 
puromycin would impair the consolidation of recently acquired stimulus information. 
Unlike other pharmacological compounds used as control agents, Flexner el al’s 
discovery unveiled that when peptide transfer is disrupted in the ribosome of 
hippocampal cells, memory consolidation is impaired. This important experiment 
revealed part of the molecular level of memory traces by manipulating a specific 
component and bringing about a differential effect in recollection. Ever since, different 
pharmacological and genetic manipulations have been used, and although we are far from 
distinguishing the neural mechanism underlying an event-specific memory trace, recent 
manipulations looking at differential effects in content-specific memory traces suggest 
that the search is promising. In a recent paper, for instance, Fellini and collaborators 
(2009) showed that NMDA receptors in CA3 are essential for pattern recognition tasks 
but not for spatial task, showing that controlled manipulations at the molecular level can 
illuminate the structure of content-specific memory traces. 
Manipulations at the neurophysiological level have also shed light on the neural 
components of content-specific memory traces. The story begins with a widely cited 
study by Duncan (1949), in which he showed that electroconvulsive treatment could 
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impair the consolidation of recently acquired information—a finding that has been 
corroborated extensively (for a recent review, see Fraser et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the 
effects of electroconvulsive shocks are quite massive, and the precise reasons as to why 
they affect memory consolidation are unclear. Many neuroscientists hypothesize that 
electroconvulsive shocks interrupt protein synthesis temporarily, which in turn affects the 
polarization of the cell membranes blocking the transport of neurotransmitters (Fink, 
1990). Fortunately, the depolarization component of the electroconvulsive shocks can 
now be isolated with the use of transcraneal magnetic stimulation (TMS), a non-invasive 
experimental technique in which a rapidly changing magnetic field sends off a weak 
electric current to a specific region in the cerebral cortex in order to produce a localized 
depolarization. Although seldom used in the context of memory given the difficulty of 
stimulating the medial temporal lobes, recent studies have explored the way in which 
depolarization affects memory retrieval. In a recent study, for example, Kohler and 
collaborators (2004) employed repetitive TMS to stimulate regions in the left inferior pre-
frontal cortex (LIPFC), which were previously associated with successful encoding of the 
studied material (using the subsequent-memory paradigm, which I explain below). 
Participants who were stimulated in LIPFC showed higher accuracy for encoded words 
relative to both non-stimulated subjects and non-LIPFC stimulated subjects. Since it 
appears that repetitive TMS above 5 Hz transiently increases cortical excitability (Hallett, 
2000)—an effect that parallels LTP—Kohler et al.’s study suggests that electric activity 
in the LIPFC is part of the mechanism underlying semantic memories.  
Even more promising dissociations can be observed when we scale up a level. 
With the advent of non-invasive neuroimaging techniques, cognitive neuroscientists are 
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starting to identify brain regions that are differentially involved during content-specific 
memory retrieval. Two important lines of evidence are of particular interest here. The 
first line of evidence pertains to findings employing the subsequent memory paradigm 
(Wagner et al., 1998). In this paradigm, participants are asked to memorize content-
specific stimuli (e.g., words, pictures, etc.) while in the MRI scanner. The recorded brain 
activity during encoding is then compared with the participant’s responses for 
subsequently remembered versus forgotten stimuli. The use of the subsequent memory 
paradigm in cognitive neuroscience has revealed a network of interrelated brain regions, 
whose engagement plays a critical role during the consolidation of memory traces 
effectively leading to the recollection of particular episodes (Paller & Wagner, 2002). 
The other line of research pertains to one of the most consistent results in the research on 
the cognitive neuroscience of memory: remembering re-activates the sensory areas that 
were involved during the encoding of the retrieved material (Wheeler et al., 2000; 
Nyberg et al., 2000). The extent to which content-specific sensory cortices engaged 
during encoding are re-activated during retrieval has only recently started being studied. 
However, the results from these studies consistently show that visual information 
selectively re-activates visual cortices, auditory information selectively reactivates 
auditory cortices, and olfactory information selectively reactivates the olfactory cortices 
(Wheeler & Buckner, 2003; Gottfried et al., 2004; Woodruff et al., 2005; see Danker & 
Anderson, 2010, for a recent review)7.  
                                                
7 Strictly speaking, neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI and ERP are detection rather than intervention 
techniques. However, as I am about to explain, when combined with intervention techniques, imaging 
methods can provide us with valuable causal information that we wouldn’t have been able to gather 
otherwise. 
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One final line of evidence that speaks to the nature of the top mechanistic level of 
memory traces comes from neuropsychology. Departing from the observation that visual 
cortices were engaged during retrieval of visual memories, cognitive neuropsychologists 
David Rubin and Daniel Greenberg studied the nature of memory deficits associated with 
selective damage in the visual cortex (Rubin & Greenberg, 1998). They observed that, 
consistent with the sensory reactivation hypothesis, patients with damage in the visual 
cortex have trouble remembering visual details of previously encoded events, leading to 
what is now called visual memory-deficit amnesia (see Greenberg et al., 2005, for a 
review of 11 cases). Importantly, the psychological manifestation of the visual memory-
deficit amnesia differs from the typical medial-temporal amnesia—such at H.M.’s—in 
that it only affects visual information; episodic information encoded non-visually or 
amodally (e.g., names) is spared. Brain lesions do not constitute direct manipulations, 
however, for it is hard to say whether a particular patient would have remembered a 
specific stimulus had she not suffered the brain lesion. A more controlled experiment 
would be called for. For instance, combining the subsequent memory paradigm and the 
TMS techniques reviewed above, cognitive neuroscientists could localize those brain 
regions preferentially engaged during the successful encoding of different stimuli (say, 
faces and houses), and then, during retrieval, they could selectively TMS each region. 
One would expect, therefore, that if the brain region that gets activated during successful 
encoding of a particular face, x, is part of the memory trace x, then by magnetically 
stimulating that very region one could control whether or not the subject successfully 
remembers having seen x.8 As such, this would be direct evidence to the effect that there 
                                                
8 Along with cognitive neuroscientist David Pitcher (MIT), I am currently conducting this particular study, 
and we hope to get the results in a few months.    
 38 
is an intermediary causal mechanism between the successful encoding of an event (Ex) 
(i.e., seeing face x), and its subsequent remembering (Rx)—or failing to remember (not-
Rx)—the event. Such an intervention—to go back to the discussion of the previous 
section—would allow the cognitive neuroscientist to “switch” the causal path from B to 
C. 
In sum, the few studies I just surveyed offer us a picture of the ways in which 
neuroscientists have manipulated, and could manipulate, memory traces at different 
levels. The putative mutual manipulability of memory traces requires that interventions 
done at one level affect the organization of the other levels. The fact that blocking 
NMDA receptors but not M2 receptors (Patterson et al., 1990) affects subsequent 
retrieval of content-specific memories, tells us that NMDA receptors, but not M2 
receptors, are a part of that memory’s trace. Likewise, if depolarizing the right occipital 
face area (rOFA) but not the right lateral occipital area (rLO) during recognition 
selectively impairs one’s recognition of a particular face, this intervention would tell us 
that that the rOFA, but not the rLO, would be part of the memory trace of that face (see 
Pitcher et al., 2009). Taken together, the results of these studies are starting to give us a 
picture of the neural underpinnings of memory traces that resembles the multi-level 
structure of the causal mechanisms involved in cyanide poisoning. Suitable interventions 
at the right level of the neural mechanisms composing memory traces may give us the 
differential effects in recollection that the anti-realist was unable to explain.  
Let me finish this section with a clarification. At this point, someone could object 
to my description of memory traces arguing that the characterization I just offered, and 
the empirical evidence I reviewed, applies to memory systems and processes—such as 
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encoding and retrieval—rather than memory traces per se. This is a valid objection, but 
only if one accepts a distinction between the mechanisms of encoding, storing and 
retrieval as they apply to a particular memory of an event, and the memory trace of that 
particular event. However, I reject this distinction. I believe memory processes and 
memory traces are essentially intertwined. As I will explain at length in chapters 4 and 5, 
memory traces are tantamount to dispositional properties of multi-level neural 
mechanisms to (more or less) reenact the pattern of activation they were in during 
encoding at the time of retrieval. This blurs the distinction between the processes of 
encoding and retrieval of a particular experience, on the one hand, and the memory trace 
of such an experience, on the other. The distinction between the two is, at most, nominal. 
Still, I believe the notion of memory trace is useful insofar as it allows us to refer to the 
causal mechanism responsible for the retrieval of individual memories.   
 
5. Experimental realism and the reality of memory traces.  
 At the beginning of this chapter I made a distinction between two ways of 
understanding the hypothetical status of memory traces. On the one hand, there was the 
philosopher’s way, according to which memory traces were a theory-independent 
hypothesis to be verifiable conceptually. On the other hand, there was the psychologist’s 
way, according to which memory traces were a theory-dependent hypothesis to be 
verifiable empirically. Next, I argued that the way in which philosophers have tried to 
settle on an answer for the theory-independent question is by wondering whether or not 
memory traces are required in order to furnish satisfactory causal explanations of 
remembering. Realists about memory traces claim that we should infer the existence of 
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causally mediating mechanisms during recollection from the claim that their postulation 
constitutes the best causal explanation for the phenomenon of remembering. Conversely, 
anti-realists about memory traces argue that causal explanations that do not postulate the 
existence of memory traces are equally good causal explanations for the phenomenon of 
remembering. However, I tried to cast doubt upon this last assertion showing how the 
anti-realist is incapable of explaining differential effects in recollection without alluding 
to intermediary causal mechanisms. As a result, I suggested that a successful causal 
explanation of remembering ought to involve reference, not only to the remembered 
event, but also to intermediary memory traces. As I suggested, memory traces become 
explanatorily indispensable precisely because their existence would be required to 
account for certain differential effects in recollection. The specific way in which memory 
traces are causally explanatory was then justified in terms of a manipulability theory of 
causation, and the exact nature of such manipulations was then described within a 
mechanistic framework. Accordingly, memory traces were defined as multi-level neural 
mechanisms of the kind studied by psychologists and neuroscientists. The two ways of 
understanding the hypothetical status of memory traces have thus collapsed.  
 Still, the philosopher may be unhappy, for even if the postulation of memory 
traces is required for a successful causal explanation of remembering, one can still 
wonder whether that is enough reason to infer that they exist. Framed as such, the 
question about our justification for accepting the existence of memory traces becomes an 
instance of the more general question about the justification for the existence of 
theoretical posits in the philosophy of science. Thankfully, there is a prominent view that 
indicates that we may be justified in inferring the existence of memory traces on the basis 
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of their indispensability in causal explanations of remembering. This view, initially 
presented by Ian Hacking (1983) and Nancy Cartwright (1983), goes under the rubric 
“experimental realism”, although sometimes it is also known as “entity” or “instrumental 
realism”. Experimental realism is better understood as a mid-point between scientific 
realism and anti-realism. It differs from scientific realism in that it is not committed to the 
existence of those theoretical entities that are postulated merely on the basis that they are 
required by the best theories we have. Experimental realism is agnostic as to whether or 
not fundamental theories are true—that is, theories containing general explanatory claims 
aimed at abstracting away from specific experimental circumstances to include general 
cases. Instead, experimental realism advocates a more austere commitment only to those 
entities that feature in the more local or phenomenological generalizations employed in 
causal explanations of circumscribed cases, predominantly in the context of experimental 
manipulations. As a result, experimental realism differs from scientific anti-realism 
insofar as it does accept the existence of some unobservable entities, to wit those that are 
required by the phenomenological generalizations used in successful causal explanations 
(Cartwright 1983; see also Clarke, 2001; Hoefer, 2008).  
 The explanatory indispensability of memory traces I have argued for agrees with 
the spirit of experimental realism. After all, when suggesting that memory traces ought to 
be treated as multi-level neural mechanisms I remain agnostic as to the structure of the 
general theory of memory that would ultimately incorporate them. Currently, in the 
cognitive neuroscience of memory literature, there are at least two general views about 
memory encoding and retrieval that offer two different ways of understanding memory 
traces. On the one hand, there is the traditional consolidation view according to which the 
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hippocampus is only required during memory encoding, because once the memory trace 
is consolidated in the sensory cortices, the frontal lobe is capable of retrieving the 
memory on its own (Frankland & Bontempis, 2005). On the other hand, there is the 
multiple trace theory, according to which the hippocampus is still required to retrieve the 
memory trace, so that the frontal cortex cannot do it on its own (Nadel & Moscovitch, 
1998). Both of these views are general theories about the nature of memory encoding and 
retrieval, and it is still an open question as to which one of them is true. However, when it 
comes to the more local explanations of differential effects during recollection due to 
well-controlled experimental manipulations, the existence of memory traces is justified, 
even if ultimately both the traditional as well as the multiple trace theory have a story to 
tell as to how to accommodate the results. The hope is, of course, that neuroscientists will 
keep on perfecting experimental interventions such that the different putative properties 
of memory traces are properly manipulated, so that eventually one theory would trump 
the contenders. But the question as to whether or not there are memory traces is 
independent of this ever occurring.9 
                                                
9 Needless to say, experimental realism—just as any other view on the realism/anti-realism debate in the 
philosophy of science—has been widely criticized (e.g., Hitchcock, 1992; Resnik, 1994; Reiner & Pierson, 
1995). Nonetheless, many believe that it still remains a strong contender in the dispute (e.g., Clarke, 2001; 
Suarez, 2008). Thus, if is good enough for them, it is good enough for me. Any further defense of 
experimental realism as a tenable position in the realism/anti-realism debate is beyond the limits of this 
chapter. 
 
  
3. Is Remembering a Propositional Attitude? 
 
When I was younger, I could remember anything, whether it happened or not. 
Mark Twain 
 
1. Introduction 
Remembering is a mental event. Therefore, it is also an intentional event: our 
memories are about something. That which our memories are about we call intentional 
objects. They are so-called in order to avoid the ambiguity with mere existing or actual 
objects, for the objects of our memories need not exist when we remember; in fact, they 
usually have ceased to exist, for what we usually remember are past events. In addition, 
memories have intentional contents. Since intentional objects can be present to the mind 
in many ways—even in ways that may not accurately correspond to how they are—we 
need a notion for their distinctive mode of presentation. The mode in which an intentional 
object is mentally presented is the intentional content of a mental state (Crane, 2009).  
Traditionally, the intentionality of remembering has been captured by treating it 
as a propositional attitude. The same goes for most memory experiences (e.g., 
remembering, recalling, reminiscing, etc.) that can be expressed, without much linguistic 
maneuvering, in the canonical form “S remember(s) that p”. I say most because there are 
some memory experiences that seem to resist such treatment, as when we say “Mike 
remembers how to ride a horse”. In this case, it seems as though we are saying, of Mike, 
 44 
not that he has a particular attitude toward a proposition, but rather toward a particular 
disposition to act (i.e., if he was to try to ride a horse he’d be able to do it). However, 
occurrent memory experiences, of which remembering is paradigmatic, do seem 
amenable to be treated as propositional attitudes. Indeed, so-called “factual” or 
“propositional memories” (Bernecker, 2009) have been conventionally treated as 
propositional attitudes, irrespective of whether they are about experienced (e.g., “I 
remember that you were wearing a hat at my party”) or non-experienced facts (e.g., “I 
remember that the Declaration of Independence was signed before the French Revolution 
began”). Since the received view sees propositional attitudes as relations between a 
subject and a proposition, most philosophers of mind working on memory are inclined to 
treat remembering along the same lines. Specific theoretical variations notwithstanding, 
the assumption that remembering is a propositional attitude has seldom been challenged, 
largely because it allegedly finds support in the logical form of memory reports and the 
apparent propositional nature of their its intentional contents.  
In this chapter I challenge the assumption that remembering is a propositional 
attitude. Although the bulk of my argument pertains to memory of experienced events—
what psychologists call ‘episodic autobiographical memory’—it is possible that some 
aspects of it translate to other kinds of memory, such as semantic or implicit memory. My 
main focus will be, then, arguing that factual episodic remembering should not to be 
understood as a relation between a subject and a proposition. My argument is two-tiered. 
In part 2, I offer an argument against the relational account of propositional attitudes in 
general, while stressing the way in which it applies the case of remembering in 
particular. The upshot is that the relational view—possibly for all propositional attitudes 
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in general, but certainly for remembering in particular—is either empirically improbable 
or explanatorily useless. In part 3, I explore an argument in favor of remembering as a 
propositional attitude that is independent of the general relational view about 
propositional attitudes. This is an argument in support of the view that the intentional 
content of our episodic autobiographical memories is propositional. In turn, I offer two 
counter-arguments against such a view. I suggest instead that the intentional content of 
our episodic autobiographical memories is non-propositional. Finally, in part 4, I explore 
some of the consequences of giving up the notion of remembering as a propositional 
attitude, and I present them in the form of a challenge—a challenge that I try to meet in 
the next chapter.  
 
2. Against remembering as relational  
According to the received view, remembering is a propositional attitude. 
Propositional attitudes are typically viewed as mental states that involve both a 
proposition and an attitude toward that proposition, so they are normally treated 
relationally (Schroeder, 2006). It is also typically assumed that propositional attitudes are 
the mental states we refer to when we use propositional attitude reports. In its most 
general form, propositional attitude reports are expressed by sentences composed by a 
subject, an intentional transitive verb, and an embedded clause that the verb takes as its 
complement. Examples of these are: 
(1.1) Mary believes that Jack is the killer. 
(1.1) Miguel and Jose think that you shouldn’t be telling that joke in public. 
(1.3) My mother hopes that I come home for Thanksgiving. 
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(1.4) I remember that you were wearing a hat at my party. 
Additionally, it is customary to regiment propositional attitude reports in the following 
fashion: 
(2) (∃S) (∃p) (∀R) (R(S,p)) 
where ‘S’ refers to a subject, ‘p’ refers to whatever the referent of the sentential 
complement clause may be, and ‘R’ to the relevant intentional relation between them 
(e.g., Fodor, 1978/1981, 178; Schiffer, 1992, 491).  
 This relational view, according to which propositional attitudes are relational 
mental states between subjects and propositions, is thus motivated by two interrelated 
assumptions. The first assumption—call it (a)—is that (2) is in fact the logical form of 
memory reports such as (1.1 – 1.4) (but see Moltmann, 2003, for a different view). The 
second assumption—call it (b)—is that you can infer the nature of the mental state 
expressed by (1.1 – 1.4) via reading off its underlying logical structure—namely (2)—
and accepting the existence of the objects picked by the bound variables upon which (2) 
existentially quantifies. Unsurprisingly, what these objects may be is a matter of 
controversy. Leaving aside the (underappreciated) problem of how to understand ‘S’, it 
seems to me that there are two general strategies when it comes to cashing out the 
ontological value of ‘p’. On the one hand, there are those who think that the subject is 
related to a non-mental entity, which is usually—albeit not always (see below)—
conceived as a truth-evaluable proposition. Call this approach non-mental relationalism. 
On the other hand, there are those who think of it as a mental entity tantamount to a 
mental representation, particularly a sentence-like formula in the language of thought. 
Call this view mental relationalism.  
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I think the relational view is problematic on two grounds. First, the assumptions,  
(a) and (b), which motivate the relational view are wrong or, at best, insufficient. And 
second, even if these assumptions were right, both non-mental and mental relationalism 
are unsatisfactory accounts of the nature of some mental states, of which remembering is 
but a case. At least for the case of remembering, I submit, non-mental relationalism faces 
what I call the problem of traction, which roughly consists in being unable to explain 
how our memories can play a causal role in our behavior. Although mental relationalism 
could in principle avoid this difficulty, it faces what I call the problem of evidence: it has 
no empirical support. Let me elaborate. 
Although both (a) and (b) are, I think, highly contentious claims, they are seldom 
argued for. When talking about “belief”, for instance, Schiffer simply assumes that it 
refers to “the relation expressed by “believes” in a sentence of the form “x believes that 
S’ (1992, 500). Similarly, Fodor claims that ‘believes’ “looks like a two-place relation, 
and it would be nice if our theory of belief permitted us to save appearances” (1978/1981, 
178). Thus, if we were to import this argumentative line to the case of remembering, the 
upshot would be that since “S remembers that p” looks relational, then remembers must 
be a two-place relation as well. Certainly this would permit us to save appearances. 
Unfortunately, it isn’t clear what are the appearances we want to save—let alone why. Do 
we want to save the appearance that, in our natural language, remembers looks like a 
two-place relation? If that is so, then I wonder what “our” is supposed to range over. 
Today, there are between 5,000 and 8,000 languages in the world (Evans & Levinson, 
2009). Each one of them constitutes a natural language. It would be a miracle if all 
natural languages would have a lexicalized verb not only sharing the same semantic field 
 48 
as the English verb “to remember”, but also taking as complement a sentential clause. 
Although less that 10% of the languages spoken right now in the world have been 
decently documented, we already find counterexamples. In Dalabon, a gunwinyguan 
language of Central Arnhem Land, Australia, there are simply no lexical verbs dedicated 
to remembering. With basic distinctions between “fleeting” and “enduring” mental states, 
and through the use of tenses and aspectual transformation, speakers of Dalabon manage 
to talk about events that happened to them in their past that have endured, and that are 
now fleetingly present to their minds. But no single lexical component is used for 
“remembering” alone, as the words employed to talk about memories can be also 
included in diverse grammatical constructions to mean different things, like “realize”, 
“attend to”, “think” and “decide” (Evans, 2007). Moreover, there seems to be evidence 
that some languages do not even make distinctions between verbs and their direct 
complements. In Straits Salish, an almost extinct language spoken by the Salish people in 
the American pacific northwest, there is only one major class of lexical item functioning 
as predicate, as is the case with intransitive verbs in English (e.g., “It rains”. Jelinek, 
1995) In neither of these languages do their approximate cognates of “remembers” look 
relational—or at least they do not look relational in the same way in which “remembers” 
looks relational in English. 
Now, why aren’t these the appearances we wanted to save? A possible answer is 
to say that the differences among languages do not really matter, for they are all 
translatable into languages for which the canonical form of propositional attitude reports 
apply. But this response only pushes the argument one step back, as we can wonder why 
we want to translate the expressions in natural languages for which the canonical form 
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does not apply to expressions in natural languages for which it does. Without a principled 
reason to prefer the latter versus the former, I don’t see why we should favor some 
linguistic appearances over the others. Another possibility is to claim that semantics is 
language-bound, so the question as to whether or not propositional attitude reports refer 
to relational mental states only arises in those languages in which propositional attitude 
reports are expressed in conformity with their canonical form. This answer would be just 
fine, I contend, if philosophers were willing to stop at the semantic level, and refrain from 
drawing metaphysical conclusions from their linguistic observations. Unfortunately, that 
is not the case, as some of them—predominantly Fodor (1975; 1985)—go the extra mile. 
Obviously, though, if we want to hold that propositional attitudes are relational as a 
matter of metaphysical necessity, we had better not base our argument in the contingent 
fact that we speak English. 
 Another possibility is to say that the appearance we want to preserve is not on the 
surface but at the deep grammar level. Thus, even if a language lacks a lexicalized verb 
for “remembering”, it may be possible that remembering-like constructions can conform, 
at the deep grammar level, to the canonical form of propositional attitude reports. This 
strategy is problematic too, for even at the deep grammar level, the distinction between 
complement, relative, and adverbial clauses isn’t always clear-cut. For instance, 
sometimes determining whether a subordinate clause pattern conforms to one or another 
structure may be, more or less, a matter of taste. “I remember when I used to play” seems 
to take as a complement an adverbial clause, but for certain purposes could be taken as a 
relative clause with an elided head noun, e.g., “I remember [the days] when I used to 
play” (Evans, personal communication). Forcing all construction patterns to look like 
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nominal phrases taking as complements sentential clauses of the form “S remembers that 
p” may look like an attempt to make the data fit the theory rather than the other way 
around. Finally, if the appearance we want to preserve isn’t grammatical at all, but 
merely conceptual, the evidence looks even grimmer. Recent attempts to document the 
conceptual structures underlying expressions of memory experiences across cultures has 
revealed that REMEMBERING is not a universal basic concept, but a construct that, 
depending on the culture, is built upon more basic concepts like KNOW, THINK and 
BEFORE (Wierzbicka, 2007). In sum, not only there is evidence that speaks against the 
universality of the concept of remembering, but there is also reason to believe that, at 
least in some languages, memory reports do not conform—neither on the surface nor at 
the deep grammar level—with their alleged canonical form, or in ways that take as 
complements referential ‘that’-clauses. This lack of uniformity in their linguistic 
expression, I believe, should at least make us wonder whether (2) is indeed the logical 
form of memory reports.  
Claim (b) isn’t less contentious. Even if we grant that, for whatever extraordinary 
means, all languages could render their own expressions of memory experiences in the 
canonical form of propositional attitude reports, and even if we grant that the logical form 
of such sentences is conveyed by an instance of the formula (2), we still don’t have to be 
committed to the claim that the intentional verb (i.e., ‘remembers’) denotes a relation to a 
proposition10. The assumption underwriting claim (b) is that by reading (2) we have 
reason to believe that the entities referred to by ‘p’ (i.e. the ‘that’-clause) exist because 
‘p’ is bound by an existential quantifier. The argument for this assumption goes roughly 
                                                
10 Much of what I am about to say probably applies to other propositional attitudes in addition to “S 
remembers that p”. However, for the purposes of the present chapter, I will confine my discussion to the 
case of remembering.  
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like this: the logical form of propositional attitude ascriptions tells us that (P1)‘that’-
clauses are referential. We know that (P2) referential terms can be bound by existential 
quantifiers, and that (P3) if a referential expression is bound by an existential quantifier, 
we have reason to believe that the entity referred by it exists. Thus, (P4) since ‘that’-
clauses are bound by existential quantifiers, then (C) the referents of ‘that’-clauses exist. 
Unfortunately, premises (P1) and (P3) may not be true. In the last two decades we 
have seen a surge of semantic puzzles pertaining to ‘that’-clauses in propositional attitude 
ascriptions (e.g., failures of substitution, failures of existential generalization, 
Kripke/Bach’s “Paderewski” cases, etc.), so many philosophers are starting to consider 
that they may not be referential at all—or, at the very least, that they may not refer to 
propositions (Bach, 1997; Moltmann; 2003; Hofweber, 2006). The truth of (P1) is, 
therefore, at least questionable. In addition (P3) seems problematic as well. For the 
conditional to be true, one needs to be committed to an ontologically loaded reading of 
existential generalization, very much in the spirit of Quine (1948).11 But existential 
quantifiers can be read as ontologically innocent, for instance in line with what Hofweber 
calls ‘an internalist view’, that is, as logical devices that allow us to increase expressive 
power in order to talk about infinitary disjunctions of single instances (Hofweber, 2006). 
Under that reading, even if ‘that’-clauses turn out to be referential after all, still we 
wouldn’t have to be committed to the existence of whatever they purportedly refer to. In 
sum, since ‘that’-clauses may not be referential, and since not all referential expressions 
                                                
11 As I have argued elsewhere (but see also Balaguer, 1998), the argument from existential quantification to 
the reality of propositions is based on Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment plus an “intentional” 
reading of the Quine-Putnam indispensability thesis (see De Brigard, 2007; for the view I am arguing 
against, see Fodor 1978/1981). Of course, Quine wanted to dispense with intentional talk, so he wouldn’t 
have pushed for realism about propositional attitudes. But Fodor (and many others) have argued against 
Quine on this point, suggesting that intentional talk is neither reducible nor eliminable (Fodor, 1974). 
Accepting this line of argument gives us the indispensability we require to apply Quine’s criterion of 
ontological commitment.  
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bounded by existential quantifiers need to be treated as real, there is no a priori reason to 
think that the referent of ‘that’-clauses exist. 
 To be sure, these difficulties haven’t gone unnoticed by relationalists. Two of the 
most promising alternatives are the so-called ‘hidden-indexical’ theories (Schiffer, 1987; 
Crimmins and Perry, 1989) and Richard’s ‘quasi-Russellian’ account (1990). According 
to the former, attitude-verbs like “remembers” have an unarticulated indexical as a third 
component. Thus, the logical form of sentences like (1.1 – 1.4) is not (2) but rather 
(3) (∃m)(Mm ∧ (∀R)(∃S)(∃p)(R(S,p,m)) 
where ‘S’ refers to the subject, ‘p’ to the remembered proposition, ‘m’ to a mode of 
presentation of type M, and ‘R’ to the three-place relation of remembering which S bears 
under m towards p. By introducing a hidden-indexical referencing a particular mode of 
presentation (which, I take it, could be construed as an intentional content), this view 
manages to avoid inconveniences having to do with substitution failures, anaphoric 
relations, and quantification. Alternatively, Richard’s quasi-Russellian view introduces 
the notion of ‘Russellian Annotated Matrix’ or RAM. There are two kinds of RAM: a 
public-language RAM and a language-of-thought RAM. The former is the ordered pair 
consisting of a sentence and a Russellian proposition expressed by an utterance of that 
sentence in a context, while the latter is the ordered pair consisting in a formula in the 
language-of-thought and the Russellian proposition that interprets it (Matthews, 2007: 
107). So, according to this view, in “John remembers that Mary is home”, the sentential 
clause “that Mary is home” denotes the public language RAM 〈〈‘is home’, being home〉, 
〈‘Mary’, Mary〉〉 which represents the subject’s language-of-thought RAM referring to 
the fact that Mary is home (Richard, 1990: 13ff). Since the public utterance can shift 
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contexts, the contextual sensitivity of the ascription is built into the formula that relates 
the two kinds of RAMs. Thus, according to this view, the correct regimentation of 
propositional attitude reports would be: 
(4) (∃f)(Ff ∧ (∀R)(∃S)(∃Я)(R(S,Яc,f)) 
where S refers to the subject, Яc to the RAM-in-context-c determined by the ‘that’-clause, 
‘f’ to a context-sensitive function of representation of type F, and ‘R’ to the remembering 
relation between S and Яc under f (Matthews, 2007: 108).  
 Despite the apparent success of these sorts of views at handling the 
aforementioned semantic puzzles, for the purposes of understanding the nature of 
remembering qua mental state, they pose more questions than they answer. For one, both 
the hidden-indexical and Richard’s quasi-Russellian accounts take ‘remembering’ as a 
three-place relation, not as a two-place relation as (a) assumes. Second, by introducing a 
third component to that relation, these accounts double our metaphysical qualms, for now 
we have to ponder its nature and how it relates to the other two. But most importantly, 
these accounts, just as the traditional non-mental relational views, suffer from what I call 
(loosely following Matthews, 2007: 105) the traction problem: any relational view of 
remembering (or any other propositional attitude, for that matter) that posits as a relatum 
some sort of abstract entity—be it a proposition, a set of possible worlds, a RAM, or even 
a presently existing past event—is going to have a hard time explaining how such an 
entity manages to be causally efficacious. And if we want our propositional attitudes to 
figure in our psychological explanations, we better have an account as to how they 
manage to produce behavior. 12 
                                                
12 Notice that this is not only a problem about how propositions manage to cause psychological states in 
virtue of their content. That’s certainly a thorny issue. But the concern I am rising here is even more basic. 
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Richard (1990) is aware of this problem, though, as the role of f in (4) can be seen 
as an attempt to get around it. Recall that he distinguishes two different objects of 
propositional attitudes: a semantic object (i.e. the public language RAM) and a 
psychological object (i.e. the language-of-thought RAM). Accordingly, the semantic 
object manages to resolve the semantic inconveniences, while the psychological object—
which is ultimately a formula in the language-of-thought—does the causal heavy lifting 
(Larson & Segal, 1995, advocate for a similar distinction). Now, the semantic and the 
psychological objects are related by f, a representational function that maps the semantic 
object onto the psychological object in different contexts. The problem is that the nature 
of this relationship not only is vague, but it is also potentially damaging for the 
relationalist enterprise. Here is why. If f is a mapping function, then it could be either 
isomorphic or non-isomorphic. Suppose that f is isomorphic. If so, then the structure of 
the semantic object mirrors the structure of the psychological object. This means that if a 
particular semantic object, a, means X in context c, but Y in context d, then the same 
contextual sensitivity must be present in the psychological object, b, that a maps onto. 
But psychological objects are not supposed to be context sensitive in the same way in 
which semantic objects are, in order to guarantee that the subject can think of the same 
thing in different contexts. So there is at least one structural property that semantic 
objects have that their corresponding psychological objects do not.13 Which means that f 
is non-isomorphic. But if f is non-isomorphic, then propositional attitudes need not be 
relational, for the logical structure that invite us to think of them as relational pertains to 
                                                                                                                                            
If one posits propositions as part of the explanation for the causes of our psychological states and 
behaviors, one better be prepared to explain how propositions can cause anything at all.   
 
13 Of course, there are many more structural properties that would work equally well for this line of 
argument, e.g., phonetic constructions, syntactic modifications, etc. (Larson & Ludlow, 1993). 
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the semantic and not the psychological object and we have no reason to believe that the 
structure of the latter tracks the structure of the former. 
 Surely one can avoid this problem by getting rid of f altogether, and the most 
natural way of doing it is assuming that the psychological and the semantic objects are 
one and the same; this is basically the approach of mental relationalism.  According to 
mental relationalism, the object of a propositional attitude is a mental representation 
whose content is that of the sentential ‘that’-clause.  In general, in order to avoid the 
problem of traction, mental relationalism subscribes to a representational/computational 
theory of mind. The most well known account of propositional attitudes in these terms is 
the Language of Thought hypothesis (LOT). Roughly, LOT suggests that ‘p’ in (2) refers 
to a mental representation in a symbolic/computational system, which is built out of 
semantically simpler representations in virtue of the system’s combinatorial syntax, and 
whose computations are defined over the syntactic or formal structure of their symbols. 
According to this view, a memory report such as (1.4) should be understood as a 
computational relation—whatever that means—between a subject (in this example, me) 
and a mental representation in my internal LOT, which is implemented in my brain, and 
whose meaning is that you were wearing a hat at my party. Now, suppose that I also 
learned that the only person with a hat at my party was responsible for the stain in the 
rug, and as a result I ask you to pay for the damages. Following LOT, the explanation 
would be, roughly, that the mental symbols that played the role of referring to you in my 
remembering are the same ones that were used for the existential instantiation of my 
belief that the only person that was wearing a hat was responsible for the stain. In turn, 
this explains why my conclusion has you as the subject of my desire that you pay for the 
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damage. And this all occurs in such a harmonious manner because the computations 
driving my reasoning are sensitive to the syntactic form of my mental representations 
(which, ultimately, is some form of brain activity), and their syntax preserves their 
semantics. 
  Unfortunately, years of research in philosophy of mind and cognitive science have 
shown that LOT faces what can be called the problem of evidence: it does not have much 
empirical support. LOT was originally proposed as a hypothesis to the best explanation 
for, basically, two sets of reasons. First, it was allegedly the only view that could explain 
language and concept acquisition, reasoning by hypothesis formation, and the 
compositionality, productivity, and systematicity of thought. Second, it was supposed to 
receive empirical support from behavioral evidence coming from psycholinguistics, 
visual processing research and theories of reasoning. Unfortunately, both sets of reasons 
have been severely undercut during the last two decades. Regarding the latter, there are 
many contemporary views of language processing that can explain the same phenomena 
LOT was set up to explain, without using explicit sentential representations (e.g, 
Barsalou, 1999; Chalmers, 1996). Likewise, mental-model theories (Johnson-Laird, 
2010) have proven to be at least as successful as LOT-like views in explaining reasoning, 
and connectionist models of vision are actually better at handling visual phenomena LOT 
proved unable to (for careful reviews, Matthews 1989; 2007: ch. 3). Regarding the first 
set of reasons, things don’t look better. Empirical approaches to language and concept 
acquisition and processing are now equipped to deal with the problems LOT was 
supposed to better handle, and the claim that non-sententialist representational systems 
cannot handle compositional and systematic semantics is simply not true. Using 
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hypotheses to the best explanation in support of a realist stance regarding certain sorts of 
entities—in this case, the referent of ‘that’-clauses in expressions of propositional 
attitudes—is always a risky business, as such hypotheses are always relative to the set of 
explanations available to us at a particular time (van Fraassen, 1980). Since the contents 
of these sets can fluctuate with time, it is always possible that a hypothesis, H, is the best 
explanation of certain phenomena at t1but not at t2. And if the reality of the theoretical 
entities posited by H was supported by H’s being the best hypothesis at t1, its demise at t2 
certainly undercuts our reasons to believe in them—even in the absence of a competing 
view! Defenders of LOT wrongly argue that in the absence of another theory that can 
explain the same phenomena that LOT explains, LOT is still “the only game in town”. 
This is false on two grounds. First, a theory can be falsified even if no alternative theory 
with the same explanatory scope is put forth, and second, it is not clear that the 
phenomena LOT is supposed to account for need to be explained by the same view. LOT 
purports to be a theory of thought, but ‘thought’ may not name a unified set of 
phenomena; maybe thought is not even a natural kind. As such, there is no reason to think 
that a single theory needs to explain thought. After all, a false unifying theory isn’t better 
than several discrete ones with a better chance at being true—or, for that matter, than no 
theory at all. 
Let’s take stock. The received view on remembering has it as a propositional 
attitude. Traditionally, propositional attitudes have been treated as relations between 
subjects and semantically evaluable entities. This relational view is supported by the 
claim that the logical form of expressions of propositional attitudes is relational, and that 
such logical form reflects reality. I argued against that relational view by pointing out, 
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first, that the logical form of expressions of remembering may not be relational and, 
second, that even if it were, there is no good reason to believe that it reflects reality.  In 
addition, I argued that the two preferred views of propositional attitudes—non-mental 
and mental relationalism—would face problems when it comes to explaining 
remembering (and, presumably, other propositional attitudes). On the one hand, non-
mental relationalism faces the traction problem, as it isn’t clear how a non-mental truth-
evaluable entity can play a causal role in the production of behavior. If I want to explain 
why my remembering that you were wearing a hat at my party is causally responsible for 
my asking you to pay for the carpet, I need an account that can tell me how the content of 
my memory played a role in my psychological process. On the other hand, I argued that 
although mental relationalism could, in principle, avert the traction problem, it faces a 
problem of its own: lack of evidence. Without empirical support, there is no reason to 
believe that when we remember we are psychologically related to a sentence in an 
internal code.  
 
3. Against remembering as propositional 
 The above arguments would only affect the view of remembering as a 
propositional attitude if one takes an ontologically loaded reading of the relational 
structure of memory reports. However, as I mentioned above, one need not draw any 
ontological consequences out of this semantic fact. Remembering can still be seen as a 
propositional attitude, from a semantic point of view, merely because the intentional 
content of our (episodic autobiographical) memories is propositional.  This observation 
goes beyond mere linguistic structures, and is grounded on the apparent fact the 
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intentional content of our memories is truth-bearing; that is, it can be either true or false. 
Indeed, the claim that the content of our memories is truth-bearing receives further 
support from one of the most cherished assumptions in the philosophy of memory 
literature: the so-called factivity constraint (Bernecker 2009, 137). According to the 
factivity constraint, “to remember” belongs to the class of verbs known as ‘factive verbs’. 
As such, an utterance or sentence such as ‘S remembers that p’ is true only if ‘p’ is true. 
And if so, then ‘p’ must denote the sort of thing that can be true. Since propositions are 
truth-bearers par excellence, it follows that the content of our memories is propositional.  
  Unfortunately, as I plan to show, there are two problems with this argumentative 
line. On the one hand, I believe that the factivity constraint is false. On the other, I think 
that memorial contents, unlike propositional contents, admit of degrees of correctness; 
they aren’t solely true (or false), but rather more or less correct. So let me begin with an 
examination of the factivity constraint.  
  Although seldom argued for, the factivity constraint is usually introduced after a 
cursory exploration of a handful of readily available examples of memory claims. 
Consider the statements: 
(5.1) I remember that Mary was wearing a green hat. 
(5.2) I remember opening the door with my own key. 
(5.3) Jose remembers that the car in front of his was scratched. 
According to the factivity constraint, if (5.1 – 5.3) individually are true, then it follows 
that Mary was wearing a green hat, that I opened my door with my own key, and that the 
car in front of Jose’s was, indeed, scratched. The truth of a memory report implies the 
truth of that which is reported as remembered. If I utter (5.1) and it turns out that Mary 
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wasn’t wearing a green hat, then I must say that I wasn’t really remembering. At most, I 
might say that I thought I was remembering, or that I seemed to remember, not that I was 
actually remembering. One can only remember things or events that were the case.  
  Virtually every endorser of the factivity constraint assumes it with no other 
argument besides the (often unsupported) claim that it is implied by the way in which 
competent speakers use the word “remembering” (e.g., Audi, 1998; Malcolm, 1963; 
Shoemaker, 1972.). Only a handful of philosophers have tried to provide some support 
for what otherwise is thought of as an obvious claim. One line of argument is to claim 
that the conjunction of a memory claim with the negation of its embedded clause is 
contradictory. According to this line of argument, if someone is to utter 
(6) I remember I that was drinking tequila but I wasn’t drinking tequila. 
then she would be contradicting herself. But (6) isn’t really a contradiction. It is only 
incoherent in the same way in which Moore’s famous “It is raining outside but I don’t 
believe it” is incoherent (Hazlett, 2010). After all, it would be a mistake to think that no 
competent user of the verb “to remember” can rationally hold (6) true. At most, (6) is 
only pragmatically incoherent, and the incoherence appears solely when the conditions, 
under which the claims before and after the “but” are evaluated, remain fixed. Thus, if we 
are to evaluate both claims according to a simple description of the recounted event, 
incoherence ensues. But the evaluative conditions between claims can easily shift. 
Consider a case in which a true Mexican charrito, known for his exquisite taste for 
tequila, parties with a cheap bottle of Jose Cuervo. In this case the first claim is to be 
evaluated as a mere description of the event, whereas the second claim is to be evaluated 
in terms of different standards of what constitutes tequila. That is why he can coherently 
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say that what he remembers drinking was tequila but it wasn’t really tequila (see 
Bernecker, 2010). 
  Another possible argument in favor of the factivity constraint is grammatical, and 
it consists in applying Vendler’s citerion to the verb “to remember”. According to 
Vendler (1972), one could distinguish between factive and non-factive verbs in that the 
former, but not the latter, can be transformed into wh-clauses. Thus, “to remember” is 
factive because it can take the form of “Jose remembers where the car in front of his was 
scratched”, “Jose remembers when the car in front of his was scratched”, etc. But what is 
really the scope of this argument? First, albeit grammatically correct, it seems to make 
little psychological sense. It may very well be that Jose does not really remember where 
the scratch was, let alone when it happened. There seem to be cases in which the wh-
clauses, produced by vendlerizing remembering statements involve information about the 
remembered event, which need not have been considered in the original statement. 
Should we say that these aren’t genuine cases of remembering, then? If we say that they 
are, then the Vendler criterion isn’t really that useful. At most it indicates something 
interesting about the grammar of the English verb “to remember” that has no bearing on 
the truth of its contents. But if we say that they are not genuine cases of remembering, 
precisely because there is some information “missing”, then we are unduly constraining 
our cases of genuine remembering to cases in which an enormous amount of information 
about a particular event needs to be brought to mind. Almost none of our memories 
would count as genuine memories then.  
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  A second reason to be suspicious of this strategy is that it is hard to apply neatly 
to memory statements about events that haven’t occurred or events that are atemporal in 
nature. Consider: 
 (7.1) I remember that I am going to see you next week. 
(7.2) I remember that the number of planets is 9.14 
In these cases, the following wh-clauses derived from (6) and (7) sound odd, if not 
grammatically, at least pragmatically: 
 (7.1*)   I remember when I will be seeing you next week. 
 (7.1**) I remember what I will be seeing you next week. 
 (7.2*)   I remember what the number of planets is 9. 
 (7.2**) I remember when the number of planets is 9. 
A possibility is to try to translate these statements into remembering-statements about 
events that happened in the past. Thus, we could say that (7.1) and (7.2) really mean: 
(8.1) I remember that I made an appointment with you for next week. 
(8.2) I remember having learned that the number of planets is 9. 
But as Munsat (1966) showed, this strategy won’t do. When I remember that I will be 
seeing you next week I need not bring to mind anything at all regarding the way in which 
I encoded the information about our future meeting, not even images of me writing it 
down in my personal schedule. I may remember that I will be seeing you next week 
without remembering that I made such an appointment. Likewise, many a times we 
remember lots of facts, like the fact that the number of planets is 9, without remembering 
                                                
14 I am aware that (7.2), unlike all other examples I’ve discussed, does not refer to an autobiographical 
episodic memory but to a semantic memory. Also, (7.1) is a case of prospective memory, which arguably 
(although less clearly) may not count as a bona fide case of episodic memory. However, since the point I 
am trying to make here is against the factivity constraint, which in turn supposedly applies to memory in 
general, that my examples aren’t confined to episodic autobiographical memory is beside the point.  
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when or how we learn them. To say that I remember that the number of planets is 9 does 
not imply that I also remember having learned it. I may have forgotten learning about it 
while I still remember the fact.  
Perhaps the most obvious argument against the factivity constraint is the simple 
fact that competent speakers just don’t abide by it when they use the word 
“remembering” (see Hazlett, 2010, for some evidence to this effect). Talk of false 
memories, for instance, is nowadays ubiquitous. Most people feel comfortable using the 
word “remembering” when referring to things that did not happen, or things that did not 
happen exactly the way in which they remember them happening. Are people just 
misapplying the word “remembering” across the board? If we follow the tradition here, 
its seems as though the answer philosophers have given is ‘yes’, as they have quickly 
dismissed the concern about false memories by distinguishing between ostensive and 
veridical remembering (Shoemaker, 1972). According to this distinction, ostensive 
memory is only “seeming to remember”, whereas veridical remembering is, well, true 
remembering, i.e., the mental state of recollecting what in fact was the case. The thought 
is, therefore, that when we use the word “remembering” when referring to events that did 
not happen, or events that did not happen the way in which we remember them, we are 
speaking loosely, for we should have used instead the locution “seeming to remember”. 
But I am not sure this strategy is warranted. Notice that the locution “seeming” has, at 
least, two possible senses (Schwitzgebel, 2008): an epistemic sense and a 
phenomenological sense. In the epistemic sense, we use “it appears” or “it seems” to 
indicate hesitation or uncertainty, as when I say, for instance, that I seem to remember 
having left the keys inside my car. False and distorted memories just don’t appear to us in 
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a way that makes us hesitant about them being memories at all. In contrast, in the 
phenomenological sense we use the locution “it appears” or “it seems” to indicate the 
way in which a particular mental content presents itself to our consciousness, as when we 
say, looking at the Muller-Lyer illusion, that one line appears longer than the other. In 
this case we express no hesitation but a mere phenomenological report. The problem is 
that, when it comes to the phenomenological sense of “seeming to remember”, distorted 
and veridical memories are indistinguishable. The distinction between seeming to 
remember and actually remembering only makes sense from the point of view of 
epistemology, but this is because the philosopher has already confined his notion of 
remembering to veridical memories—a decision that is not grounded in the way 
competent speakers use the word “remembering”.  
  This last point actually dovetails with the second reason why I think memorial 
contents may not be propositional. Suppose you entertain a mental state you think is a 
memory but someone gives you a piece of information that reveals inconsistencies 
between the way the content of the memory is present to you, and the way the event—at 
least according to that person—actually happened. Sometimes, when this occurs, one of 
us just admits that he was wrong and that the event occurred as the other person reported 
it. But most times the disagreements aren’t settled in terms of right and wrong. Many 
times people simply agree that they remember events differently, with more or less detail, 
or more or less accurately. There is usually no disagreement in telling whether a version 
is right and another one is wrong, but when it comes to correct versions, there may be 
disagreement as to which one is more or less accurate. Accuracy admits of degrees. 
Someone may remember an event better than someone else, without anybody having to 
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be wrong. Moreover, one may even say, of a person who remembers something false 
about a past event, that she remembers it better than another person who only remembers 
something true about that event. Suppose that Sam and Tom witness the exact same 
event, say, a little baby being picked up by his mother at the park when he was crying. 
Sam reports the event thus: 
(9)  I remember that the baby was crying and his mother picked him up. 
All that’s true. But Sam does not remember what the baby was wearing. If pressed, he 
wouldn’t be able to tell you. Tom remembers the same details that Sam remembers, but 
he also remembers that the baby was wearing an overall with an illustration. Here’s the 
rub: he remembers that the illustration depicts a boat but it actually depicts a plane. Tom 
reports the event thus: 
(10) I remember that the baby was crying, his mother picked him up, and he 
was wearing an overall with a picture of a boat on it. 
I take it that most people would say that Tom remembers the event better than Sam, even 
though Sam’s report, unlike Tom’s, is true. The reason, I surmise, is because we evaluate 
the content of our episodic memories in terms of degrees of correctness. Memories, in 
that sense, are like perceptions. They include a plethora of sensory details that one can 
get more or less right. When you remember a particular episode, you bring to mind a 
complex sensory scene that represents the experienced event more or less accurately.  
  Now, the fact that the contents of our memories can be correct or incorrect 
however, does not mean that they are propositional. As Tim Crane (2009) has recently 
argued for the case of perception, it does not follow, from the claim that a particular 
perceptual experience represents the world as being in a certain way either correctly or 
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incorrectly, that the content of a perceptual experience can be true or false. Correctness, 
unlike truth, admits of degrees. But propositional contents can only be true or false 
(McDowell, 1994). Thus, Crane argues, perceptual contents aren’t propositional. I think 
the same argument, mutatis mutandi, applies for episodic autobiographical memories. As 
in the case of Sam and Tom, when we bring to mind a past event, the intentional content 
we are aware of is rich and complex; it represents an experienced event in ways that 
range from very sketchy to very faithful. Remembering just the gist of an experienced 
event is, indeed, different from remembering in a more detailed way, but this difference 
isn’t captured by saying that one content is false while the other one is true.  
  A possible reply here is to say that this is merely an expression problem. One 
could say that no matter how richly detailed and complex an episodic memory may be, 
there is a possible sentence (or utterance) the content of which is the same as the content 
of the memory. If they had the right sorts of linguistic resources, then Tom and Sam 
would have been able to properly express the contents of their respective memories by 
way of two different sentences, each one of them expressing different propositions. But 
notice that this reply capitalizes on a loose understanding of “same content”. The thesis 
cannot be that the content of the possible sentence is identical to the content of the 
memory. Stipulating such an identity simply begs the question. The obvious alternative is 
to say that the sentence perfectly describes the content of the memory. But the 
description of an intentional content is not identical with the content itself (Crane, 2009). 
Not only are there many ways one can describe a particular intentional content, it is also 
unclear whether any description can manage to capture the intentional content in its 
entirety without any informational loss. 
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  This last consideration—reminiscent of Dretske’s (1982) distinction between 
informational formats (i.e., pictures are analogue, propositions are digital)—suggests a 
last argument against the claim that the content of our episodic memories is propositional.  
When philosophers claim that a particular content is propositional, they normally imply 
that the person entertaining such content must be able to deploy the concepts constituting 
the proposition. In other words, a person cannot entertain a propositional content unless 
she possesses the concepts required for believing such proposition.  Thus, if we can show 
that one could have an intentional content for which one does not have the relevant 
concepts, the possibility of non-propositional intentional contents follows. This is 
precisely what Martin tried to do with the example of Archie and the cuff link (Martin, 
1992; the example is originally Dretske’s, 1969). The example invites us to imagine that 
Archie is looking for his cuff link. He looks in the drawer but fails to notice it. He was in 
a hurry, as he had to get to an important dinner. On his way to the dinner he revisits his 
searching the room and he sees himself, as it were, looking into the drawer. Having a 
good visual memory, he conjures up a detailed image of the drawer. Now he realizes that 
the cuff link was in the drawer. He had failed to notice it before because he did not attend 
to it.  
  The point of Martin’s example is that both during perception and during 
recollection, the drawer looked to Archie in a certain way. But—Martin contends—if the 
content of Archie’s perception of the drawer was propositional, then he would have been 
able to form the belief that the cuff link was in the drawer. However, he did not form that 
belief. Only later, upon recollection, was Archie able to form the belief that the cuff link 
was in the drawer. But given that the content of the recollection fully depends upon the 
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content of the original perception, Martin concludes that the way the drawer appeared to 
Archie during perception must have been the same way in which it appeared to him 
during recollection, even though he was only able to form the belief that the cuff link was 
on the drawer when he remembered it. Therefore, Martin concludes, Archie entertained a 
mental content during perception that wasn’t constrained by the concepts he deployed 
during the perceptual experience. The content of his perception was non-propositional.  
  Unfortunately, there is an obvious problem with Martin’s argument: it is simply 
false that one’s recollection fully—and solely—depends upon the perceptual experience 
it is a recollection of. Psychological evidence clearly shows that our recollections are 
highly reliant on current conditions of recall, including one’s beliefs, intentions and even 
prior related perceptual experiences (as I extensively argue in next two chapters). As a 
result, it is perfectly plausible that in remembering the drawer, Archie was actually 
cobbling together pieces of information that came from other sources, in addition to the 
perceptual information of his perceptual experience while he was looking at the drawer. 
Thus, Martin’s claim that the intentional content during perception and during 
recollection is the same is simply not warranted.  
  Nonetheless, Martin was onto something important. In order for his example to 
succeed, he needs to show that there is some kind of information that is made available to 
the subject during recollection, due to her having experienced it during encoding, but 
which nonetheless was unavailable for the subject to form a belief about it at the time. 
And anyone familiar with the literature on memory would recognize that this is basically 
the definition of priming. In a classic study, Tulving and collaborators (1982) presented 
participants with a list of words during a study session. Later, at test, participant saw 
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word fragments that could have been completed by more than one word. Relative to 
controls, participants who were exposed to the list of words during test tended to 
complete the word fragments with words from the studied list even though they had no 
conscious recollection of having seen those words before. This study—as well as its 
innumerable subsequent replications—suggests that forming the conscious belief of 
having seen a particular stimulus during encoding is not necessary for that stimulus to 
have an effect later on during retrieval. In fact, there is no need to even form a conscious 
belief about the stimulus during encoding for it to have a subsequent effect during 
retrieval. Following Tulving et al’s lead, Forster and Davis (1984) presented participants 
with words subliminally—i.e., words that were rapidly flashed (~50 milliseconds) and 
immediately masked by different words with a longer exposure time (~500)—in order to 
determine whether conscious awareness during encoding was required for priming. The 
results showed that words subliminally presented also generate priming, so neither during 
encoding nor during retrieval is conscious awareness required for encoded stimulus to 
produce a differentiable effect during recollection. Incidentally, these studies, as well as 
Martin’s example, highlight the role of attentional allocation during recollection. What 
we are consciously aware of seems to be determined not only by what we pay attention to 
during encoding, but also what we focus on during retrieval. Since Archie did not attend 
to the relevant location in the drawer when encoding, he was unable to form a conscious 
belief about the presence of the cuff link at the time. It was only when he focused on the 
right region of his memorial content that, upon retrieval, he was able to form the belief 
that the cuff link was effectively in the drawer. Likewise, a case can be made to the effect 
that when we fail to attend to a particular stimulus, it does not reach conscious awareness 
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via working memory, in which case the information isn’t stored in long-term memory for 
subsequent explicit retrieval. Attentional allocation thus becomes a necessary condition 
for encoding material in long-term memory (This point will become relevant below, and 
it will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.)     
  Let’s take stock one last time. I began this section pointing out that the arguments 
put forth in the second section only affect an ontologically loaded reading of the 
relational view. An ontologically innocent semantic reading of such view can still hold 
that remembering is a propositional attitude on the basis that memorial contents are 
propositional. So I suggested that there is still reason to believe that remembering is not a 
propositional attitude from the fact that memorial contents may not be propositional.  I 
offered two arguments in favor of that claim, both aimed at showing that memorial 
contents aren’t truth-bearing. The first argument targeted the factivity constraint, the 
acceptance of which could support the claim that memorial contents are truth-bearing. 
The second argument tried to show that memorial contents admit of degrees of 
correctness, as opposed to the all-or-nothing view of truth-values assumed by 
propositionalists. I ended up this argument suggesting that, by not being propositional, 
memory contents may include non-conceptual information.  
 
4. Conclusion: The challenges 
In this chapter I tried to show that the view according to which remembering is a 
matter of being in a relation with a proposition is wrong. In the first part, I argued against 
the relational aspect of this view by pointing out that relationalism faces one of two 
problems: either it has a hard time accounting for the way in which propositions can play 
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a causal role in psychological explanations (the problem of traction) or it has a hard time 
finding empirical evidence in its support (the problem of evidence). In the second part, I 
argued against the claim that the content of our memories is representational. In doing so, 
I suggested that memorial contents may not be truth-bearers, that they can be more or less 
accurate, and that attention seems to play a critical role in making perceptual information 
available for episodic encoding and retrieval.   
Each one of these claims, however, constitutes a challenge, for denying that 
remembering is a propositional attitude comes with a price. As a result, a successful 
account of remembering must give us the tools to explain how memories can cause 
behaviors and other psychological states in virtue of their content. Additionally, to be 
empirically sound, it must make sense of the different degrees of accuracy, and it should 
explain the role that attention plays in making some perceptual information available for 
encoding and retrieval. Finally, a successful account of remembering must also be able to 
make sense of another phenomena the propositional attitude account managed to account 
for: the fact that mental contents are sharable. Two or more people can believe the same 
belief, wish the same wish and, presumably, remember the same memory. I confront 
these challenges in the next chapter. 
  
 
4. Memory, Attention, and Joint Reminiscing 
 
If we consider evidence rather than presupposition, remembering appears to be far more  
decisively an affair of construction rather than one of mere reproduction. 
F.C. Bartlett (Remembering, 1932: 205) 
 
1. Introduction 
I went to a primary school far away from home. As a result, I often had to endure 
very slow bus rides of over one hour in heavy traffic. To avoid boredom, the other kids 
and I used to play a game called “Veo Veo” (“I See, I See”). It was rather simple. One of 
us, gazing through the window of the bus, would glance over the busy scenery of the city. 
Meanwhile, everybody else would keep their eyes closed. Eventually, the kid who was 
surveying the scene would mentally single out a particular object and he would say “Veo 
Veo”. That was the sign for the rest of us to open our eyes and ask “¿Qué ves?”—“What 
do you see?” He would then give us one clue, a particular aspect of the object of his 
attention, and we would try to guess the object he had in mind. We could ask up to five 
questions of the form “Does it have an X?”, where X was a property of the object we 
thought the kid was attending to. If the kid said “no”, that meant we were focused on the 
wrong object, so we would have to attend to a different one with only four questions 
remaining. If the kid said “yes”, then one could either keep asking—just to make sure one 
had the right object in mind—or one could try to guess what the intended object was. If 
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you were wrong, you’d have lost. But if you guessed correctly, you’d get to pick the next 
objet. The point of the game was then to be the first one in attending to the same object as 
the kid who got to pick it. 
What we were doing was an exquisite exercise in what psychologists call joint 
attention: our capacity to attend to the same object while also realizing that the other 
person is attending too (Moore & Dunham, 1995). Consider the moment in which the kid 
who had mentally selected the object in his visual field realizes that another kid guessed 
correctly. How does the former know that his thought refers to the same object the latter 
has in mind? First, both of them need to have the selected object in their visual fields. 
This, obviously, is not enough. After all, the other kids, at some point or another, had the 
selected object in their visual fields. Additionally, they both needed to single that object 
out of its surroundings; both of them must have selectively attended to it.  But, once 
again, this isn’t enough. Another kid, whether playing or not, may have been attending to 
that very object, at that precise moment, without realizing that the object of his or her 
attention was the object chosen by the kid who was picking it out. What is required, then, 
is a kind of attentive triangulation, whereby both kids are aware of each other and of the 
object, plus the recognition that each other knows that the object they are attending to is 
the chosen one. According to Campbell (2002, Ch. 8), this attentive coordination makes 
the other subject, as well as the object, a constituent of the content of their joint mental 
state. 
But now suppose that we want to play a different game, one that we may call “I 
Remember, I Remember”. It is just like “I see, I see” except that, in this version, one of 
the participants remembers a particular object or event and then the others have to guess 
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what he has in mind. It sounds much harder, doesn’t it? After all, unlike the case of 
perceptual joint attention, the alleged constitutive relation between the perceivers and the 
object of attention cannot be met. In the case of joint reminiscing, the intentional object is 
not present—it may not even exist. Moreover, unlike perceptual joint attention, it isn’t 
required that both subjects were ever at the same time in direct contact with the object of 
their memories. For instance, one can jointly reminisce about an old professor with 
another alumnus of the same school that one just met. Of course, it may be possible that, 
in the course of jointly reminiscing, both realize that they shared a class, but this does not 
mean that, at the time, they both were aware of each other jointly attending to the 
professor.   
Surprisingly, though, we engage in joint reminiscing all the time. What does it 
take for us to engage in joint reminiscing? How can two or more people jointly entertain 
the same memorial content? Moreover, how can we jointly refer to an object or an event 
that is long gone? One obvious possibility—if you are a philosopher of mind, that is—is 
to say that both rememberers relate to a mental sentence referring to the same 
proposition, and that both relate to it with the same (memorial) attitude. For reasons I 
discussed in the previous chapter, I am skeptical of this response. In this chapter I want to 
offer a different explanation. Departing from an idea first suggested by Russell (1913), 
and later on developed by Campbell (2002), I suggest that our capacity to refer to 
particular objects or events during memory retrieval crucially depends on our capacity to 
direct our attention inwardly toward the relevant components of our memory experience. 
Inward attention is not enough, however. In addition, I argue that we must possess the 
ability to refer to a certain object by way of pointing to a different one. Finally, I claim 
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that in order to jointly reminisce, we must have the capacity to direct someone else’s 
attention inwardly toward the relevant aspect of the mental representation we want them 
to focus on, so that they get to know which past object or event we are deferedly 
ostending. I explain each element of my account in turn. 
 
2. Memory and mental ostension 
Let me start with a methodological digression. One of the morals I wanted to 
draw from the previous chapter is that we should distrust the strategy of trying to draw 
conclusions about the nature of our psychological states on the basis of semantic analyses 
of the expressions with which we report or ascribe them. Language is the social product 
of an evolved psychological capacity, and I know of no good reason to believe that it 
manifests equally in all cultures, that it has a universally shared logical structure, or that 
such structure reflects reality. Instead of this language-to-mind approach, I want to follow 
a different strategy. Suppose we want to understand what is the mental state referred to 
by a memory report such as: 
(1)  I remember that you were wearing a hat at my party. 
Instead of thinking how the world should be for (1) to be true, I suggest that we should 
try to figure out, on the basis of what we know about the world, how we manage to 
truthfully express mental states with sentences like (1). This mind-to-language approach 
involves at least three stages: (a) understanding the content of a memory experience, (b) 
understanding how we manage to truthfully express such content, and (c) accounting for 
the relation between the content of a memory experience and its object. The purpose of 
this section is to give an account of (a) and (b). I leave (c) for the next section.  
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Let us begin by putting (1) in the context of a memory experience. I am grocery 
shopping, strolling down the aisles, when all of the sudden I hear a female voice, behind 
my back, calling my name. Think of what happens as a result of my hearing this brief 
sequence of phonemes. First, since I was silently focused on a particular visual scene, the 
noise made my attention shift from the shelves onto the stimulus behind my back. Given 
the silence around me, any auditory stimulus would have done that, of course. But this 
noise was a particularly relevant sequence of phonemes: it was my name. Had it been any 
other sound against a noisy background, I may not have heard it. But my brain is attuned 
to certain noises that are socially relevant for me, like my name, and as a result it makes 
me conscious of them even if I had been sensitized to background noises of equivalent 
pitch and volume (Triesman, 1983). This shift of attention to an exogenous stimulus, 
which my brain had already recognized as socially relevant, in turn shifts the cognitive 
mode I am in to what psychologist Endel Tulving called “retrieval mode”: a mental state 
in which I am poised to retrieve information from memory. This occurs as I turn my back 
toward the source of the stimulus, no more than 400 or 500 milliseconds after its onset. 
The face, the tone of voice and the mannerisms of the woman behind me constitute the 
perceptual cues with which I now try to recognize her—but to no avail. Perhaps noticing 
my (micro) facial expression of confusion, she appends her call out with a new utterance: 
“We met last week at your party”. This new string of auditory information, added to the 
already in-process perceptual cues, reactivated particular memory traces toward which I 
now turn my attention inwardly. Now I am covertly surveying bits and pieces of the 
different visual scenes I am being conscious of. These images are presented to me as 
blurry snapshots, maybe even quick footages, of scenes featuring my house and my 
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friends in situations I recognize as having happened last week during my party. All of the 
sudden, there is a match between the perceptual cues and the memory trace I’m aware 
of—a phenomenon Semon (1904/1921) called “ecphory”. My attention has been focused 
upon a particular region of a scene in which I see a person that highly resembles my 
interlocutor; she’s bending down, picking something she seem to have dropped on the 
floor, and she looks at me. I see she’s wearing a hat, and I utter (1). The woman in front 
of me smiles approvingly. No more than four seconds elapsed since she said my name. 
 The first thing to notice is that the information I am aware of when I finally 
remember that she was wearing a hat at my party presents to me in a way that can be 
accurate or inaccurate; I may not remember the color of the hat, for instance, or she may 
not have been picking something up. In this sense, then, my memory experience has 
intentional content. Now, how did I become aware of that particular content? The answer 
to that question actually involves two parts. First, we need to understand how the brain 
manages to retrieve this particular memorial content, and then we need to account for 
how the retrieved content becomes conscious. Let us start with retrieval. Most 
philosophical accounts of memory retrieval have been mere speculations based on the 
commonsensical idea that experiences are somehow saved in a metaphorical storehouse, 
where they lose vivacity over time as though they were accumulating dust, awaiting their 
eventual retrieval during recollection. Recent developments in cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience have shown that this view is very much mistaken. For one, memory 
consolidation—i.e. the physical process by means of which the brain changes so as to 
encode experienced information in a memory trace—is a highly selective process. Not all 
the information that was initially perceived is encoded, and not all the information that is 
 78 
encoded is available for retrieval. Much of our sensory information is lost due to 
inattention and working memory limits, as well as normal decay caused by lack of 
rehearsal and, apparently, selective consolidation during sleep (Paller & Voss, 2004).  In 
addition, the encoded information does not remain stable over time.  Almost four decades 
of research in the cognitive psychology of false and distorted memories have shown that, 
during retrieval, memories become malleable and prone to being contaminated by 
extraneous information (Roediger, 1996). Finally, evidence also suggests that events that 
were only sketchily encoded can nonetheless be remembered with detail via pattern-
completion processes that fill in the missing information in surprisingly reliable ways 
(see McClelland et al., 1995, and next chapter). 
As a result, there is now wide consensus among neuroscientist regarding the 
reconstructive character of our memories (Schacter et al., 1998; Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
Remembering does not consist of the exact reproduction of previous experiences, but 
rather of the reconstruction of previously entertained mental contents by way of 
reactivating the brain regions that processed them during encoding (Rugg, 2009). 
Reactivation, of course, is not all there is to it, as we need to tell apart memories of 
previous events from experiences of current events. The brain manages to do that by way 
of incorporating, during retrieval, brain regions that were not involved during encoding, 
and also by redeploying some of the same regions for different purposes. In particular, 
whereas encoding recruits the sensory cortices and the medial temporal lobes, retrieval 
additionally recruits pre-frontal and parietal cortices.   
To better understand what I mean by memory contents being reconstructed during 
retrieval, let’s go back to the previous example to see how my memory of the woman 
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with a hat gets first encoded and then retrieved.  Suppose that, at my party, I did in fact 
meet the woman with the hat, and I did in fact attend to her picking something up from 
the floor. My sensory cortices first processed this fleeting perception in a distributed 
manner (i.e., visual information in occipital cortex, auditory information in auditory 
cortex, etc.). Since I did pay attention to her, and to the fact that she was wearing a hat, 
this perceptual information made it into my working memory, and in turn it was bound 
together by the hippocampus as a single, unified event.15  Neurophysiological evidence 
suggests that the area CA3 of the hippocampus carries out this binding, storing a sort of 
index of the episode (McClelland et al., 1995). However, this index does not include any 
sensory information per se. Instead, it records the manner in which the pattern of sensory 
activation during my perceptual experience occurred in order to reenact it at retrieval. 
Thus, when presented with a cue—in this case, the utterance of my name—the brain gets 
into retrieval mode, which apparently is subserved by the fronto-polar cortex (Rugg & 
Wilding, 2000). Using every piece of sensory data as a potential cue for retrieval (e.g., 
the woman’s voice, her physique, etc.) my brain tries to get the hippocampal index to 
reactivate a perceptual pattern. Yet it is only upon the pronunciation of the right cue—in 
the example, a contextual-semantic piece of information—that ecphory is achieved, and 
the right index gets to reactivate, more or less, the pattern of neural activity in which it 
was when it first perceived the woman at my party. Incidentally, the fact that every time a 
memory trace is reactivated it occurs in a different neuronal and experiential context 
(e.g., the mental state one is in at the time of recollecting), means that each reactivation of 
a memory is also an instance of reconsolidation (Moscovitch et al. 2005; Hardt et al., 
                                                
15 Had I not paid attention to her, sensory information would not have made it to working memory, so it 
would not have been consolidated in long term memory. Aspects of the event could, nonetheless, be 
retrieved subsequently, but only in a non-declarative manner 
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2010). This helps explain why retrieval makes memories vulnerable to distortion. In sum, 
the content of my memory is the result of a complex process of sensory reactivation in 
which sub-personal level representations are bound together in order to reconstruct the 
perceived content during retrieval. 
Now, how did I become aware of this content? More specifically, how is it that 
the retrieved content presents to me as being about this woman wearing a hat at my 
party? My suggestion is that it becomes conscious when I covertly focus my attention on 
the region of my retrieved representation depicting the woman’s hat as she was turning 
toward me. Only then was I able to (sub-personally) match the retrieved content with my 
present perception, and only then was I able to recognize her as the woman I am talking 
to right now. Additionally, it was only when the attended content of my representation 
became the focus of my conscious experience that I was able to say that I remember that 
she was wearing a hat at my party. In other words: it was by way of mentally delineating 
a particular region of my intentional content that this aspect of the scene was 
experientially highlighted to me, and it was this highlighting that made it available to my 
conscious reporting. This is basically the memorial equivalent of what Campbell (2002) 
calls the Causal Hypothesis for visual perception: “When, on the basis of vision, you 
answer the question, ‘Is that thing F?’, what causes the selection of the relevant 
information to control your verbal response is your conscious attention to the thing 
referred to” (p.13). My claim is that the same mechanisms by means of which you 
consciously attend to a region of space are responsible for the experiential highlighting in 
a memory experience. I call this experiential highlighting “mental ostension” (tantamount 
to what Prinz, 2007, calls “mental pointing”). To mentally ostend or point toward an 
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aspect or a feature of a mental content is to focus one’s attention inwardly toward such 
aspect. And mental ostension is the mechanism by means of which the mental content—
or the region of the mental content—we attend to becomes available for conscious 
report.16  
This hypothesis finds strong support in evidence coming from cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral studies show that attentional mechanisms gate 
information into working memory. Since having information in working memory is a 
condition of possibility for its being verbally reported, failure to attend to a particular 
aspect of the content would result in failure to report such information verbally. Studies 
using a dual-task paradigm during retrieval show a significant reduction of recollection in 
divided attention relative to full attention (Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000). This effect is 
even larger when the secondary task taps at the same kind of material as the primary task. 
So, for example, if the retrieval task is verbal, a word-based secondary task would be 
more detrimental to successful recollection than a digit-based or a picture-based task 
(Fernandes et al. 2005). Further evidence comes from neuropsychological studies. 
Damage in posterior parietal cortex usually causes attentional deficits, with hemispatial 
neglect being the most typical one. Patients with neglect fail to attend to the hemispace 
contralateral to the lesion even though they show no sign of perceptual deficiencies. 
When asked to describe a room or an object, for instance, they basically ignore 
everything on the side opposite to the locus of the lesion. Interestingly, the same occurs 
when they are asked to remember a familiar place. In a classic study, Bisiach and 
Luzzatti (1978) asked a patient with severe hemispatial neglect to remember the main 
                                                
16 Although I have endorsed the view that attention is the mechanism for consciousness (De Brigard & 
Prinz, 2010), all I need to be committed to here is the weaker claim that retrieved contents are made 
conscious when inward attention makes them available for working memory. 
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square in Milan, the city he lived in all his life. Although his language capacities where 
impeccable, his report omitted all the buildings to the left of the square when he 
remembered it facing one direction. Then he was asked to imagine crossing the square 
and turning back, so that now he’d be facing the opposite side. Again, he failed to report 
the left-hand buildings, even though those were the buildings he had just reported! A 
final piece of evidence comes from recent neuroimaging studies, as activation in parietal 
cortex—strongly linked to attentional mechanisms—is one of the most frequent findings 
in PET and fMRI studies of episodic retrieval (Rugg & Henson, 2002).  
 This last piece of evidence speaks to another important component of this 
hypothesis: it accounts not only for voluntary but also for involuntary recollection. 
Philosophers and psychologists are mostly interested in memories that are deliberately 
retrieved. However, many of our memories just pop into our minds spontaneously—
sometimes to a debilitating extent, as it occurs in PTSD (Berntsen, 2009). According to 
the view I am suggesting, involuntary memories, just like voluntary memories, become 
conscious when their contents are made salient by focusing our attention upon them. But 
there are two sides to saliency: a certain region of our memorial content can become 
salient because we pay attention to it, but we can also pay attention to it because it is 
salient. This two-way directionality of saliency has been explained by cognitive scientists 
in terms of two distinct attentional mechanisms: top-down and bottom-up. The former 
refers to a deliberate and controlled attentional search, and it is thought to be carried out 
by a dorsal fronto-parietal network. Conversely, bottom-up attention refers to unexpected 
and spontaneous detection of stimuli, and it is supported by a ventral fronto-parietal 
network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Recent neuroimaging and neuropsychological 
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studies have shown that both attentional mechanisms are differentially engaged during 
retrieval of voluntary and involuntary recollection (Cabeza, 2008). Consistent with the 
attentional dissociation, voluntary recollection recruits the dorsal fronto-parietal network 
to a greater extent than involuntary recollections which, in turn, appear to engage the 
ventral fronto-partietal system. Neuropsychological data also supports this view. A recent 
study of two patients with damage to ventral regions of their parietal cortices showed 
severely diminished free-recall of autobiographical memories relative to controls, but 
normal recall when explicitly cued (Berryhill et al., 2007). This suggests that goal-
oriented direct attention drives voluntary recollection, but free-recall—and presumably 
involuntary recollection—engage bottom-up attentional mechanisms. Thus, during 
voluntary recollection mental ostension is the result of top-down attentional mechanisms, 
whereas in involuntary recollection, it is achieved via bottom-up attentional capture.  
In sum, when I retrieve episodic information I reconstruct sub-personal level 
representations by way of binding them together, a process that involves an interaction 
among the parietal cortex, the medial temporal lobes and the pre-frontal cortex. The 
content that becomes available for conscious report is that which I have directed my 
attention toward. Voluntary goal-directed memory retrieval is subserved by top-down 
attentional mechanisms, whereas involuntary spontaneous recollection is driven by 
bottom-up attention. Finally, when attended contents are consciously experienced they 
become available for working memory, which in turn allows for the phonoarticularoy 
system to engage in vocal or subvocal linguistic production. When the resultant verbal 
production is vocal it constitutes an utterance which—modulo communicative intentions 
and good faith—aims at reporting the mental state of which it is an effect. This is, 
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therefore, a rough sketch of what happens when I utter (1) in a situation like the 
exemplified above. And now that we have an rough idea of what the content of a memory 
experience is (point (a) above), and how we manage to truthfully report it (b), it is time to 
tackle question (c) regarding the relation between the intentional content and the object of 
my memory experience.  
 
3. Remembering as deferred mental ostension 
If the above account is on the right track, remembering is a matter of mentally 
pointing toward an experiential content, and it is by way of mentally pointing toward 
such content that we can make it available for conscious reporting. As it stands, however, 
this view poses a difficult question. In the case of perception, the object that is mentally 
ostended—or ‘experientially highlighted’, in Campbell’s terms (2002)—is in direct 
contact with the perceiver. Indeed, in the relational (realist) view that Campbell puts 
forth, the object becomes a constituent of the experiential content. Thus, for Campbell, 
there is no need to separate the intentional content and its object when it comes to making 
them available for consciousness. However, in the case of memory, the object of one’s 
recollection isn’t in direct contact with the rememberer. In fact, the object of one’s 
memory not only is not present when we remember it, it usually no longer exists. How 
can we be aware of an object or event with which we are no longer in direct contact?  
One possibility is to go the direct realist route (Reid 1785/1849). According to 
this view, remembering is tantamount to direct perception, in that the intentional objects 
are directly apprehended. Intentional contents, particularly representational contents, are 
thus disposed of. For direct realism has it that remembering is just like perceiving, except 
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that its objects—i.e., that which is remembered—do not exist in the present: they exist in 
the past. Although relatively popular among some philosophers (Laird, 1920), and even 
some psychologists (Gibson, 1979), direct realism for memory (although not for 
perception) fell in disrepute. It faces, after all, difficult obstacles. For one, direct realism 
suggests an analogy between memory and perception but it does not specify the extent to 
which they are similar, or how to accommodate their obvious differences. Memories, for 
instance, are phenomenologically different from perceptions, and they are usually 
coarser. Other functional dissimilarities go beyond mere phenomenology. Memory and 
perception also differ in the capacity to provide us with discriminatory information. For 
instance, while we can visually tell apart very similar shades of red when perceived 
simultaneously, we are at random if we are to rely solely on memory (Halsey & 
Chapanis, 1951). In addition, memories decay and are often blurry and lifeless. Also, we 
tend to remember fewer details of non-traumatic old memories than of traumatic or recent 
ones, even though we perceive both kinds of events equally well. Non-salient events tend 
to be more easily forgotten than salient ones, even if the salient ones occurred much 
before in time. It is hard to see what the equivalent of this kind of saliency effect would 
be for perception. Finally, there is the problem of false memories. Empirical evidence 
shows that the mechanisms of veridical and non-veridical remembering are very much 
the same, and that many of our veridical memories are actually the result of the same 
mechanisms that give us non-veridical memories (see Schacter, 1995, and chapter 4). But 
non-veridical memories are about events that never occurred. As a result, the direct realist 
would have to explain not only how can memory be in direct contact with an event that 
no longer exists—or that exists in the past (whatever that means)—but also with events 
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that never existed. Some metaphysical maneuvering could potentially solve these issues, 
but it is unclear whether this is a price we want to pay, the alternative being to simply 
accept the existence of representational contents (Furlong, 1948).  
Aware of these problems, Campbell suggests a different non-representational 
alternative, based upon McCormack and Hoerl’s notion of temporal decentring: “The 
ability to temporally decenter is the ability to consider alternative temporal perspectives 
on events and to understand the relationship of these perspectives to one’s current 
perspective” (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999; see also Evans, 1982). Accordingly, Campbell 
suggests that our capacity to refer to remembered objects or events depends upon our 
capacity for temporally decentering. It is only when we acquire the capacity to temporally 
decenter that we can grasp the truth-conditions of judgments tensed at times different 
from when they are uttered. According to this view, in order to understand the sentence: 
(2) I see that you are wearing a hat at my party 
when uttered  in the presence of the object of attention (i.e., the person wearing a hat at 
my party), we only need to be able to grasp the truth-conditions of the judgment as it 
applies to the current situation. But in order to understand (1) we need to be able to move 
away from the current temporal situation, and grasp the truth-conditions of the judgment 
as if it had been made at a different time, namely the relevant moment in the past. 
Therefore, there is no need for direct contact with the past object, nor a reference to any 
intermediary mental representations. All that is required is the acquisition of a particular 
skill—i.e., temporal decentering—so that we can refer to the object of our conscious 
recollective experience as if we have been talking about it at a different time (Campbell, 
2002: 181) 
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 Although I am not completely unsympathetic to this view, I find it unsatisfactory 
for two reasons. First, according to McCormack and Hoerl (1999), the development of 
episodic memory depends upon our acquisition of temporal decentering, which in turn 
depends upon the acquisition of the concept of personal/perspectival time.  Although this 
hypothesis seems to fit much of the data in the developmental literature, it has a hard time 
accommodating data coming from neuropsychology. After all, individuals with amnesia 
are perfectly capable of using personal/perspectival concepts, and thus are perfectly 
capable of temporal decentering, even though their episodic memory is damaged 
(Rosenbaum et al., 2006; Craver, in preparation). This suggests that temporal decentering 
is not required for episodic memory. Second, defining something as a cognitive skill or 
capacity does not preclude it from requiring representations, whether conscious or 
unconscious. In fact, even motor skills appear to require proprioceptive representations in 
the somatosensory cortex, the neurons of which code for specific postural situations. 
Explaining the specific mechanisms of a particular skill may still require the postulation 
of intermediary representations. 
 This, I think, is precisely what happens when we refer to the objects of our 
memories. I believe that we can keep the intuition that mental ostension is the mechanism 
by means of which we can refer to the object of our memories without having to accept 
temporal decentering. Instead, I suggest that what allows us to refer to past objects or 
events when we are consciously attending to a particular mental content that presents 
itself as being about a previous experience, is the covert equivalent of our overt capacity 
to ostend or demonstrate deferredly. Notice that the root of the problem we are facing is 
that what we mentally point at when we remember is not identical to what we refer to. 
 88 
Consider (1) again. When I utter (1) I am not talking about my mental experience but 
about the event in which this woman was wearing a hat at my party. It is an event that no 
longer exists. But what I am inwardly attending to—what I am mentally pointing at—is a 
region of the intentional content I am being aware of, right now, as I am having the 
mental experience of remembering the woman wearing a hat at my party. Schematically, 
if ‘p’ stands for the intentional object of my memory, and ‘r’ stands for the intentional 
content of my memory, according to my proposed account, when I remember that p I am 
talking about p while pointing at r.  
 Linguistically, the phenomenon of ostending at a certain thing ‘r’ in order to refer 
to a different thing ‘p’ is known as deferred ostension (Quine, 1968: 194). Consider the 
classical example due to Evans (1981: 199). We are walking down the street and I point 
toward a parked car covered with parking tickets. Pointing at it I say ‘That man is going 
to be sorry’. The intuition here is that even though I am pointing at the car—that is, even 
though my demonstration (Kaplan, 1989) is directed toward the car—the object 
demonstrated or referred to is not the car, but the owner of the car. Or consider the 
situation in which I point to a set of footprints and say ‘He must be giant!’, or the case in 
which I am holding a copy of The Confederacy of Dunces and say ‘he’s my favorite 
author’ (Borg, 2002). These too are cases in which I am pointing at something (e.g., 
footprints, a book) while refereeing to something else (e.g., whatever animal left the 
footprints, John Kennedy Toole).  
 My suggestion is that the same sort of phenomenon occurs when we remember 
episodic memories. To understand what the objects of our memories are, and 
consequently to be able to talk about the objects of our memories, we first learn how to 
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mentally refer to something that is not perceptually present in one’s environment but that 
nonetheless is present in our conscious experience. Developmental psychologists have 
debated for decades whether preverbal children have episodic memory. Some 
developmental psychologists suggest that visual pair comparison tasks, whereby babies 
are presented with novel versus familiar objects and their kicking rates are measured, are 
good indications of the origins of episodic memory. However, many others disagree, as it 
is always possible to interpret this paradigm as tapping at implicit rather than explicit 
memory. Nonetheless, probably all developmental psychologists agree that deferred 
imitation of action sequences does in fact demonstrate the emergence of episodic memory 
(Barr et al., 2005). Moreover, older adults with medial temporal lobe damage as well as 
individuals with developmental amnesia have trouble with this task, further suggesting its 
intimate relation with episodic memory (McDonough et al., 1995; Adlam et al., 2005). In 
this paradigm, infants are shown a relatively unusual sequence of actions with a particular 
object. For instance, the experimenter may show the child that in order to get the key out 
of the box she needs to first hit the box three times with the tip of the magic wand and 
then once with the bottom. Then the child is either left alone (and recorded) or the 
experimenter leaves for a few minutes and comes back with the wand, asking the infant 
whether she can get the key out of the box. Prior to 6 months of age, infants are 
completely incapable of reproducing previously learned action sequences. There is some 
evidence that they can perform deferred imitations of brief sequences after 6 or 7 months 
of age, as long as the retention interval—i.e, the elapsed time between study and test—is 
kept fairly short (Barr et al, 1996). Gradually, children learn how to perform action 
sequences that are increasingly more complex, that have longer retention intervals, and 
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that are retrieved with less specific cues (Hayne et al., 2000). By the second year of age, 
deferred action sequences are pretty much established.  
 Notice that, prior to 6 months of age, infants are capable of pointing. If one shows 
a 4 month old the magic wand, she can point at it. Nonetheless, she does not see it as 
related to anything that happened before. It is just another object in the visual field, 
however interesting it may be. After 6 or 7 months of age, though, the infant appears to 
be able to see the magic wand as something more than a mere present object. She sees the 
magic wand as related to a previous event. It is no longer an isolated visual stimulus: the 
wand becomes a cue. It becomes the sort of object the perception of which can elicit the 
mental content that presents to the infant as this or that sequence of previous actions. 
Now, the experimenter is able to ostend at the wand, while the infant perceives it, and ask 
for the right sequence of actions: “Can you get the key out of the box?” The fact that the 
infant can indeed come up with the right sequence of actions strongly suggest that she 
knows that one can talk about a previous ‘p’—a sequence of actions—while pointing at a 
present ‘r’—the magic wand.  
 As time goes by, the perceptual cues can become less and less concrete, that is, 
less and less similar to the perception of the original event. Eventually a pretend wand 
can elicit the memory, then just the waging of a finger, the uttering of a word. Suddenly, 
the demonstration of the cue, and perhaps the cue itself, becomes irrelevant. All that 
matters is that it can elicit the retrieval of the right sort of mental content, and that it can 
experientially highlight the relevant property of the resultant conscious experience. 
Neither my hearing the woman’s voice nor my seeing her face succeeded in triggering the 
right memorial content. It was only when she gave me the contextual information that 
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ecphory occurred, and the right intentional content was then retrieved17. Now, the sensory 
information I have been presented with mentally highlights a certain aspect of that 
content, which is experienced by me as a reinstatement of the perceptual event of seeing 
this woman bending down, and turning her face at me, wearing a hat. Mental ostension is, 
thus, an acquired skill, and deferred mental ostension is a way we learn to use mental 
pointing to refer to something else—usually that which caused the retrieved intentional 
content to begin with18. My suggestion, therefore, boils down to no more than this: we 
can talk about the intentional objects of our memories because we can refer deferredly to 
them by mentally pointing toward the intentional contents we experience when retrieved 
by the right cue. Remembering a past event is a case of deferred mental ostension.      
 
4. Joint reminiscing as concerted mental deferred ostension 
 Let me review what I have said so far. In the first section I argued that memorial 
contents are reconstructed out of sub-personal level representations via a process of 
                                                
17 Presumably, a working hippocampus is required for ecphory to take place. Absent the right sort of 
hippocampal index, the process of pattern completion required for sensory reactivation is hindered, so no 
mental content upon which to turn one’s inward attention is retrieved. This would explain why individuals 
with medial temporal lobe damage fail at the deferred action sequences paradigm and, incidentally, partly 
explains why they fail to retrieve unconsolidated memories. 
 
18 So far, I have only talked about mental deferred ostension, in analogy with linguistic deffered ostension. I 
wonder, however, if what I have said here may have also some application to the lingustic phenomenon as 
well. In a recent comprehensive study on deferred ostension, Emma Borg (2002) shows that the strategy of 
treating deferred uses of demonstratives as a different semantic kind of indexicals, is wrong-headed. She 
presents persuasive arguments to the effect that the differences ought to be accommodated at the pragmatic 
level. Indeed, she suggest that the same pragmatic rule that works for perceptual uses of demonstratives 
also works for deferred uses, as long as the child learns that there are more than one way to demonstrate an 
object. Her proposal, then, “is simply that there are lots of ways to draw an object to attention to facilitate 
the use of a referring expression, and pointing directly to the object is just one way amongst others—other 
ways which include pointing at a related object” (Borg, 2002: 509). The development of episodic memory 
may provide the psychological basis for one of these forms, and it is likely that other forms are similarly 
developed (see, for instance, Hoerl & McCormack, 2004, where learning to refer to distal causes via 
pointing at current perceptual events is explored).  
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pattern-completion that reactivates, more or less19, the sensory cortices that were engaged 
during the perception of the remembered event. Then I argued that we become conscious 
of these mental contents when we direct our attention inwardly to them. I called that 
process “mental ostension” (or “mental pointing”). I suggested that the memorial contents 
we mentally point at are thereby reportable, as they have been poised for verbal control in 
working memory. Then, in the second section, I claimed that mental pointing was not 
enough to explain how we get to talk about events or objects that aren’t in the 
surroundings of the rememberer. I therefore argued that the capacity to talk about 
something not present while pointing at something present was required for the 
rememberer to be able to talk about remembered events or objects. Following the 
convention in linguistics, I called that capacity “deferred mental ostension”. Now, in this 
last section, I suggest that in order to acquire the capacity to jointly reminisce we need to 
learn how to orient our attention inwardly alongside other co-reminiscers in order to 
mentally ostend at memorial representations with the same contents, which in turn allows 
us to speak about the objects that those contents represent. 
 Consider, once again, the situation in which I find myself uttering (1). Imagine 
that, after my brief encounter at the supermarket, I ran into a friend whom I know was at 
my party, and the following dialogue takes place: ‘I just ran into the woman who spilled 
wine on my carpet at the party’. ‘Which one?’—my friend asks. ‘I don’t remember her 
name’—I reply. ‘You mean the woman who was wearing a hat?’ ‘That one!’—I say. 
What just happened? Think of what occurred during this brief exchange. I ran into my 
friend and by mentioning my recent encounter at the supermarket, I shift his cognitive 
                                                
19 I say “more or less” because neurological evidence suggests that even though there is reactivation at the 
systems level, there are changes that occur at the local neural level. The precise relationship between the 
sensory reactivation at the systems level and the neural changes at the local level is unknown. 
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mode toward that of reminiscing. When he asks “which one?” I assume he’s trying to 
single out a particular individual from his own memory experience of the party. In other 
words: my opening sentence serves as a verbal trigger for his own memory trace of the 
party. Now he’s surveying, via his own top-down attentional mechanisms, his own 
intentional content. But, of course, he does not know whom am I talking about yet. There 
were many women at my party. So he asks for a distinctive feature that may help him 
single her out: her name. Since I don’t know her name he tries a new one: the hat. He is 
now mentally pointing toward the region of his intentional content depicting the woman 
in a hat, so he asks for confirmation. My saying “that one” is as good evidence that we 
are talking about the same remembered object, as my saying “that one” is when we are 
jointly attending at the same object in our visual field. 
 Let me stress this point. Most discussions of perceptual joint attention appear to 
make the act of pointing—what Kaplan called “demonstration” (Kaplan, 1989)—
essential for the process to effectively take place. But one can engage in joint attention 
without any demonstration overtly taking place by any of the attendees. An object can 
demonstrate itself, as it were, by making itself salient in one’s perceptual field. Suppose 
you are watching a soccer game when, all of the sudden, an enthusiastic fan runs from 
one side of the court to the other wearing no clothes. The event did not disturb the 
development of the game, but it was enough to grab the attention of many people in the 
audience, including yours and your friend’s. “Do you see that?” your friend asks. There 
is no need for him to overtly point toward the enthusiastic fan. Your attention, just like 
your friend’s, has been disengaged from what it was focused on before—the player with 
the ball, presumably—and it has moved onto a new target: the zealous fan.  The 
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demonstrated object is its own demonstration.  Likewise, one can guide someone else’s 
attention toward a particular target without having to use overt pointing. One can help the 
other person navigate the perceptual field using intermediate salient targets as reference 
points. Suppose you fail to notice the naked fanatic because it failed to disengage your 
attention from the soccer ball. Thus, when your friend asks you whether you’ve seen that, 
you rightly ask, “what?” Given the distance between the naked fan and your seats, 
pointing is useless. And given the fact that he’s holding a hot dog with one hand, and a 
beer with the other, handwaving is out of the question. So he finds a landmark, a salient 
reference point, and orients your attention from there. “See the side referee? Draw an 
imaginary line from him to the goal, and you’ll see what I’m talking about”. Your 
attention has been reoriented, and now you are both jointly attending at the same target.  
 I believe that an equivalent process goes on in the case of joint reminiscing. I can 
expect my friend, whom I know was at the party, to have encoded much of the same 
information I encoded then. The information we both encoded isn’t identical, of course. 
Even if we both were looking at the woman from the same side of the room at the exact 
same time, we both occupy different spatial locations, so our perspectives are going to 
differ. But these differences need not matter. Memorial contents represent their objects 
with varying degrees of correctness (see chapter 2), and just as there may be differences 
within a subject between the way an event was originally perceived and the way it 
presents itself during recollection, there may be also subtle differences between subjects 
that still allow us to talk about the same memorial content being entertained by two or 
more joint reminiscers. Just as in the case of the fan in the soccer game, I can guide my 
friend’s attention to highlight a particular object or aspect of his intentional content—the 
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woman with a hat—so it becomes the target of his mental ostension.  I can use—as in my 
imaginary example above—a reference to a salient feature of the object itself: the hat. 
But I could have also oriented my friend’s inward attention using other reference points: 
she was sitting over to one side, she had a lovely smile, she was the last one to leave, etc. 
Of course, the process can also go the other way around. Upon remembering this lady, 
my friend may be able to re-orient my attention toward a different aspect of the woman I 
did not remember at the time—her perfume, say, or the fact that she had brought a 
delicious bottle of wine. The capacity to mutually coordinate each other’s attention so as 
to consciously highlight the (pretty much) same intentional contents I call “concerting”. 
Consequently, our capacity to talk about the very objects represented by the intentional 
contents we are conscious of during joint reminiscing would be “concerted mental 
deferred ostension”. 
 Importantly, memory allows a temporal dimension of concerted mental deferred 
ostension that isn’t present in perception: we can direct each other’s attention along a 
temporal line. In other words, we can mutually direct each other’s attention toward 
memorial contents depicting events that occurred before or after a certain target event. 
For instance, when jointly reminiscing about the woman at the party, my friend can 
reorient my attention toward the beginning of the party, and mentally highlight to me the 
fact that she was not wearing a hat when she arrived. “She must have gotten it from 
someone else who was already there”. In fact, he could even guide my attention 
backwards in time, reminding me that the party was not the first time I met that woman. 
“Remember, about a month ago, we had that picnic at the park…” This kind of concerted 
mental ostension along temporal dimensions is unique to memorial contents. In fact, 
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empirical evidence coming from developmental psychology strongly suggests that 
concerted mental ostension plays a fundamental role in children’s learning how to talk 
about their memories. In a recent paper, Hoerl and McCormack (2004) survey a series of 
studies in which conversations about autobiographical memories between children and 
caregivers are analyzed. These narratives, the authors observe, exploit causal links 
between experienced events in order to guide the children backwards or forward in time. 
Here’s an example of one such conversation, between a mother (M) and her child (C): 
 M: What happened to your finger. 
 C: I pinched it. 
 M: You pinched it. Oh boy, I bet that made you feel really sad. 
 C: Yeah… it hurts. 
M: Yeah, it did hurt. A pinched finger is no fun… But who came and made you 
feel better? 
C: Daddy! 
I believe this is a clear example of concerted mental deferred ostension. The mother starts 
off highlighting a particular mental content for the child, and invites her to explore 
certain aspects of that content, like the emotion she felt when it happened. Then there is a 
temporal exploration via focusing her attention in a particular causal link: the transition 
from being in pain to getting better. Mother and child are, thus, jointly reminiscing an 
event that occurred later in time via consciously attending to a different memorial content 
representing the effect of the event depicted by the previously attended memorial content. 
Therefore, when jointly reminiscing, attended contents can become not only spatial but 
also temporal reference points.  
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 To conclude, allow me to briefly recapitulate the main points of this chapter. I 
started off endorsing Campbell’s perceptual attention view to the effect that mental 
highlighting—or mental ostension, in my terms—allows us to refer to the objects or 
events we are aware of. Then I suggested that remembering is a matter of inward 
attention toward retrieved memory traces. When retrieved memorial traces are mentally 
ostended—either via top-down (as in voluntary recollection) or bottom-up (as in 
involuntary recollection) attentional mechanisms—the mental content of one’s memory 
becomes conscious. In turn, mental ostension makes the intentional content available for 
verbal reporting. In this sense, uttering a sentence such as (1) in order to express one’s 
intentional content at the time of recollection is tantamount to describing one’s content of 
experience. As such, the utterance used to express the intentional content of a memory 
experience has to be understood as a description of that content, and it need not reflect 
the structure of the content at all (see chapter 2 and Crane, 2009). In addition, I argued 
that in order for the speaker to successfully refer to the object of his or her memory, the 
capacity to mentally point to a present conscious experience while referring to a non-
present one is required. In analogy with the linguistic phenomenon, I called this capacity 
“deferred mental ostension”. Finally, I claimed that in order for two or more people to 
engage in joint reminiscing, and thus to be able to successfully refer to the same 
experienced past events, they are required to mutually coordinate their attention toward 
relevantly similar regions of their memorial contents. I called this processed “concerted 
mental ostension”. Only when there is concerted mental ostension it is possible for two or 
more remembers to refer to the same past event. Joint reminiscing is, therefore, concerted 
deferred mental ostension. 
  
 
5. Is memory for remembering? 
 
So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names. 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1.2. 
 
1. Introduction 
On October 4th, 1992, a cargo plane from the Israeli airline El Al crashed into an 
apartment building in Amsterdam, exploded and left 43 people dead and several hundred 
injured and homeless. The event dominated the local news for many days. Ten months 
after the accident, a group of psychologists led by H.F.M Crombag distributed two 
questionnaires among a hundred Amsterdam residents. The first questionnaire asked 
residents whether they had seen the footage showing the plane crashing, and whether, 
based on their recollection of the video, they could estimate how much time elapsed 
between the plane crash and the explosion. Participants’ estimations varied, but 55% of 
them remembered having seen the footage. Only 18% reported not remembering the 
video at all. A second, modified, questionnaire was distributed to another group, asking 
the residents questions about specific details of the accident as captured by the video—
for example, the angle at which the plane hit the building, the exact way it broke apart, 
etc. Although there were some disagreements among their answers, 66% of respondents 
reported remembering the video vividly (Crombag et al., 1996). Here is the rub: there 
was never a video; there were a few photographs, but there was no footage, no amateur 
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recording, not even computerized reconstructions of the accident. Most of the people 
surveyed simply misremembered. 
 Far from being an unusual result, evidence gathered over the last three decades of 
research in cognitive science clearly show that people are prone to misremembering past 
experiences (Breinerd & Reyna, 2005). So-called false memories are a systematic and 
common occurrence in our ordinary lives, and they present a challenge to the traditional 
philosophical view of the function of memory. According to the traditional view, 
memory20 is for remembering, and remembering consists of reproducing the contents of 
past experiences. When philosophers discuss the problem of false memories, they 
typically try to safeguard the traditional view following one of two strategies. The first 
strategy is to say that if a particular mental content appears to the subject to be a memory 
even though it does not correspond to an experienced event, then the subject is not really 
                                                
20 Two terminological clarifications. (1) It is an unfortunate linguistic fact of the English language that the 
word ‘memory’ is so polysemous. Consider the sentence “She has an extraordinary memory”. It could 
mean that she has a good memory-qua-cognitive-system—she may be able to store a lot of information, for 
instance—or it could mean that she has a memory-qua-mental-state whose content happens to be out of the 
ordinary. As much as possible I will try to disambiguate these senses, but for the most part, when I talk 
about memory, I refer to the cognitive system. (2) Philosophers and psychologists recognize several kinds 
of memory. What psychologists call ‘procedural’ or ‘non-declarative memory’, for instance, roughly 
corresponds to what Bergson (1908) and Russell (1921) called ‘habit memory’, and James (1890) called 
‘secondary memory’. ‘Declarative’ or ‘non-procedural memory’, which psychologists operationalize as the 
kind of memory whose contents can be consciously declared, more or less corresponds to James’ notion of 
‘primary memory’. Declarative memory, in turn, is usually divided in ‘semantic’ and ‘episodic memory’ 
(Tulving, 1983). Semantic memory refers to knowledge of facts and situations about the world that we need 
not have witnessed; when we recall semantic memories there is no need for mental imagery associated to 
the place and/or time in which the remembered event occurred. Some philosophers take semantic memory 
as tantamount to propositional memory—i.e., mental occurrences that can be expressed as ‘remembering 
that p’—but this is wrong. After all, there are non-semantic memories that can be expressed 
propositionally, just as there are semantic memories that can be expressed with a gerund. Categories based 
on surface grammar just don’t square with psychological classifications. Finally, episodic memory refers to 
memory of experienced events. It roughly corresponds to what some philosophers have called ‘recollective 
memory’, ‘personal memory’, ‘experiential memory’, or ‘direct memory’ (Furlong, 1948; Locke, 1971; 
Malcolm, 1963; Martin and Deutscher, 1966; Bernecker, 2010). Although there is some disagreement as to 
whether or not these terms define perfectly equivalent categories, I am going to leave that issue aside. I am 
going to refer to the kind of memory I’d like to discuss simply as ‘memory’, bearing in mind that the sort of 
mental experience I mean to talk about falls roughly within the psychologist’s definition of episodic 
autobiographical memory. Examples include memories about particular events in one’s childhood, this or 
that party I went to in college, the moment in which I received my bachelor’s degree, or the exact instant in 
which my wife said ‘I do’ at our wedding.  
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exercising her memory but rather her imagination. From this perspective, then, all those 
individuals that reported having seen footage of the plane crashing were not really 
remembering: they were merely imagining. After all, since the traditional view holds that 
one can only remember what happened, false memories—that is, memories that do not 
correspond to what actually happened—are simply not genuine memories. Accordingly, 
one can still say that memory is for reproducing past experiences, as cases of false 
memories are not the products of memory at all. The second strategy philosophers take to 
safeguard their view is to say that false memories are indeed the result of exercising 
memory—and when false memories occur, memory itself is malfunctioning. From this 
perspective, all the people that claimed to have seen the video of the accident were indeed 
exercising their memories, but they misremembered because their memory systems 
malfunctioned. As a result, the view that memory is for remembering remains 
unchallenged, as false memories are simply the product of a faulty memory, the actual 
function of which is to reproduce past experiences. 
In this chapter I argue that the traditional view is mistaken. I contend that memory 
is not for remembering. There are three sections to this chapter. In the first section I 
review some critical findings from cognitive science and neuroscience suggesting that 
false memories are both normal and pervasive. I argue that trying to reconcile these 
results with the traditional view would have unwanted consequences. On one hand, I 
argue that if we follow the first strategy, and consider false memories to be the product of 
imagination, not memory, we may have to say that some bona fide cases of remembering 
are not produced by memory. On the other hand, I contend that if we follow the second 
strategy—that false memories are the product of memory malfunctioning—we may have 
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to accept the counterintuitive claim that it is advantageous to have a memory system that 
normally fails. In order to avoid these pitfalls, I claim that our basic assumptions about 
the function of memory need to be revised. I undertake this revision in the second section 
of this chapter, where I examine the way in which we tend to individuate cognitive 
functions. This analysis leads me to defend a strategy according to which the function of 
a cognitive faculty is determined by its contribution to the cognitive organism. In the 
third section, I apply this strategy to the case of memory, and I reject the idea that seeing 
memory as a cognitive system for reproducing past experiences is the best way of making 
sense of its function. Instead, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger 
system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be 
the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that the function 
of memory is to permit the flexible recombination of perceptual components of memory 
traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, 
in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events. I conclude by 
showing how this account can accommodate the evidence that is problematic for the 
traditional view, how it allows us to say that ordinary instances of false recollection are 
indeed produced by memory, and how it preserves the intuition that many ordinary cases 
of false recollection are the result of a memory system that is, in fact, functioning quite 
well. 
 
2. Remembering what did not happen 
The idea that the function of memory is to remember past experiences is grounded 
in the fact that when we ordinarily exercise our memory, the contents of the resultant 
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mental states appear to us as being about previous experiences. This fact has led many 
philosophers to the natural conclusion that the function of memory is to reproduce the 
contents of previous experiences. What licenses this conclusion is an argumentative 
strategy I call the content-based approach. According to this approach, determining the 
function of a cognitive faculty is a two-step process. First one figures out the way in 
which the contents of the mental states purportedly processed by the target faculty are 
experienced, and then one surmises that the system that produces those mental states 
must be there for that purpose.  
The content-based approach—which essentially is a functional characterization 
based on the domain specificity of a cognitive system (see section 2)—is widely assumed 
in many discussions about the function of cognitive faculties in philosophy of mind. 
Unsurprisingly, memory is no exception. In particular, the content-based approach is 
followed by most proponents of memory representationalism. The predominant view in 
the philosophy of memory,21 memory representationalism, says that when we remember, 
we deploy a mental representation depicting an event we experienced in the past. And, 
since memory representationalists are also representationalists about perception, 
remembering is typically understood as the reproduction or revival of previous perceptual 
representations. When confronted with the possibility that the representational content 
one is aware of when trying to remember may not correspond to previous experienced 
events, memory representationalists usually point toward some sort of mnemonic marker 
                                                
21 Although memory representationalism is the predominant view in philosophy of memory, it is not the 
only one. Its most prominent contender is direct realism. According to its most general interpretation, direct 
realism says that when we remember we don’t deploy a mental representation of the experienced event; 
rather we become directly aware of the event itself. Direct realism is usually associated to Thomas Reid, 
but it has had some partisans since (see Locke, 1971, and Warnock, 1989). However, I think direct realism 
is an untenable position. As I argued in chapters 2 and 4, I believe that in its most extreme version, direct 
realism faces difficult metaphysical obstacles. As a result, for the purposes of this paper, I take memory 
representationalism as the default philosophical view. 
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by means of which we can distinguish reproductions of representations of previous 
experiences (i.e. memories) from mere reproductions of representations that do not 
correspond to previous experiences (i.e. imagination). Mnemonic markers are 
phenomenological properties specific to memorial contents (Bernecker, 2008). However, 
memory representationalists differ in the way they characterize mnemonic markers. Some 
claim that when the initial perception is reproduced by memory it is accompanied by the 
belief that it occurred in the past (Spinoza, 1985; Locke, 1979) or that it occurred in one’s 
own past (James, 1890). Others think that the reproduced perceptual representation is 
accompanied by a decayed feeling of vivacity (Hume, 1978) or a strong feeling of 
familiarity (Mill, 1829; Russell, 1921). For the purposes at hand, however, these 
differences won’t matter. The point is that, according to memory representationalism, 
remembering consists in reproducing previous perceptual representations. Accordingly, 
the function of memory is to assure the correct reproduction of previous perceptual 
representations by way of preserving the structure of the original perception (Hume calls 
this structure “the order and position of the ideas” [Hume, 1978, 1.5.], whereas Stout 
speaks of memory as re-instating past perceptions “in the order and manner of their 
original occurrence” [Stout, 1915]). As a result, when memory functions well—that is, 
when it successfully preserves the structure of the original perception—the reproduced 
mental representation is accompanied by some sort of mnemonic marker. It is 
unsurprising, then, that according to the traditional view, false memories are explained as 
cases in which memory fails to perform its function (Kurtzman, 1983). 
Not all empiricists thought that false memories were the product of a faulty 
memory. Russell, in particular, thought that if, as a result of having been conferred the 
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kind of structure that normally elicits mnemonic markers, a certain mental representation 
is felt to be a memory, it is not clear that we should blame memory. After all, memory’s 
role is to preserve the structure of previously experienced ideas, not to prevent them from 
being endowed with new forms—that is what imagination does. Consequently, only those 
ideas that preserve the structure of the original perceptions can be called genuine 
memories. Anything else would simply be a product of imagination, regardless of 
whether it is experienced as a memory or not. This is basically the way Russell tackled 
the famous example of George IV. According to this example, George IV 
misremembered having been in the battle of Waterloo because his repeating stories of 
having been there so often made him believe that he actually was. Russell claimed  that 
George IV’s continuously asserting that he was in the battle of Waterloo was 
instrumental in conferring the kind of structure that, later on, would elicit mnemonic 
markers when entertained. But, since this structure was conferred by imagination rather 
than preserved by memory, his apparent remembering would not have been a case of 
memory’s malfunction. In fact, Russell went on to suggest that “cases of fallacious 
memory can probably all be dealt with in this way, i.e, they can be shown to be not cases 
of memory in the strict sense at all” (Russell, 1912: 116-117).  
The problem is that considering genuine memories to be only those mental 
representations that preserve the structure of the perceptions they reproduce may force us 
to say that we are merely imagining at times in which we are clearly remembering. 
Consider some of the most common distortions in our ordinary experiences of 
autobiographical recollection: the field/observer effect, the telescope effect, and the 
boundary extension error. The field/observer effect is one of the most widely experienced 
 105 
and documented memory distortions (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Most of our memories are 
‘field memories’, in the sense that we tend to remember the events they portray from the 
point of view from which we experienced them. ‘Observer memories’, on the other hand, 
refer to people’s tendency to remember autobiographical events from the point of view an 
observer other than oneself would have had, had that observer been present during the 
remembered event. Thus, when we remember observer memories, we do so from a third 
person point of view; we can see ourselves in the mental picture, as it were. Nearly 
everyone has experienced observer memories at some point in their life. Usually, highly 
traumatic events tend to be remembered as observer memories; indeed, most involuntary 
recollections experienced by subjects with post-traumatic stress disorder are reported as 
observer memories (Rubin et al., 2008). Another commonly experienced distortion is the 
telescope effect (Neter & Waksberg, 1964), which refers to people’s tendency to 
remember recent events as being more remote than they actually were, and remote events 
as being more recent. Unless the specific date of a particular event is included in the 
content of the memory so as to chronologically anchor it (such as memories of 9/11), 
many of our memories are subject to the temporal distortions of the telescope effect. 
Finally, there is the common distortion of boundary extension, in which certain objects 
are remembered from a wider-angle view than they were experienced, creating the 
impression that the places in which these objects were initially encounter were larger than 
they actually are (Intraub & Hoffman, 1992). What all of these effects have in common is 
the fact that they present the remembered content in a distorted way, in a way that does 
not preserve the original structure of the experienced event. However, I submit that the 
mental experiences described by these effects still constitute genuine cases of 
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remembering. If I go back to my childhood room, and I show you how my books and 
toys were arranged, I do so in virtue of the fact that I remember my room and my books 
and my toys, even if my memory does not preserve the exact structure of the original 
perception (that is, even if I remember my room as being larger than it is). Consequently, 
the spatial and temporal distortions exemplified by these ordinary effects show us that 
there are genuine cases of remembering that do not preserve the structure of the original 
perception but are not mere imaginations (see Debus, 2007; Sutton, 2010).  
Some might defend Russell’s view that false memories are not the product of 
memory by arguing that these effects are actually the result of two different processes: 
one in which memory accurately recalls preserved information, and another one in which 
imagination distorts the structure of the perceptual components with which this 
information is conveyed. Thus, even cases of observer memories—where recalled 
information presents to our mind from the perspective of an observer different from us—
would still count as remembering, insofar as memory effectively succeeds in recovering 
the preserved information. The distortion is merely a further effect of imagination. There 
are two problems with this defense. On the one hand, distortion is a matter of degree. If 
we allow small variations, like changes in perspective or shifts in the angle of our 
viewpoint, why can’t we say the same of relatively larger variations, like the color of a 
remembered object or the gender of a remembered person? And if we admit those, why 
can’t we say that larger variations—say, remembering pictures of a plane crash as 
footage—also count as memories? If we want to say that only some distorted memories 
count as genuine cases of remembering, the burden is on the objector to come up with a 
non-arbitrary way to tell the difference. On the other hand, this defense is threatened by 
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the possibility that far from being an exception, memory distortions may actually be the 
rule. Consider, for example, the fact that the temporal structure of our memories is 
normally distorted: remembering an event (almost) never takes the same amount of time 
it took us to experience it. Thus, if we say that imagination is involved in disarranging the 
temporal components of our memories, then it looks as though imagination may be 
involved in almost every recollection (I make a stronger case for this claim below). 
However, in saying that imagination is permanently involved in the exercise of memory, 
we risk blurring the distinction between these distinct faculties. The trick is to understand 
how the two can be different faculties even if some of their mechanisms overlap. This—
as I suggest below—requires understanding the mechanisms of remembering differently.   
Most philosophers are not persuaded by Russell’s approach. They find the 
alternative strategy of saying that memorial effects like field-observer or boundary 
extension are indeed produced by memory, not by imagination, more appealing. 
Nonetheless, since the occurrence of these distortions shows that memory failed to 
preserve the structure of the original experience, then these particular recollections should 
be considered the product of a malfunctioning memory. Given that the function of 
memory is to accurately preserve the structure of the original perceptual representation, 
when it delivers reproductions of such perceptions with the wrong structure, memory is 
simply failing to perform its function. In summary, from this alternative perspective, all 
false and distorted memories are indeed the effects of our memory system, they just so 
happen to be produced by a failure of its mechanism.  
The main problem with saying that false memories are a failure of memory is that 
it forces us to accept that we have a memory system that regularly and systematically 
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malfunctions. Evidence gathered by cognitive scientists in the last four decades makes it 
clear that false and distorted memories are a common occurrence in our daily lives. One 
of the most widely used experimental paradigms for false memory research is known as 
the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. This paradigm consists of showing an 
individual a list of either perceptually or semantically related words (e.g. tired, bed, 
awake, rest, dream, night, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, pillow, peace, yawn, drowsy) 
that are associated to a non-presented lure (e.g. sleep). Subsequently, participants perform 
an old-new recognition task—that is, a task in which they have to say whether the word 
they are seeing is “old” (i.e. it was on the study list) or “new” (i.e. it wasn’t on the study 
list)—when shown a list of words that include some of the previously presented words 
(e.g. bed), some non-presented non-related words (e.g. hamburger), and some non-
presented related words or ‘lures’ (e.g. sleep). In general, false recognition of 
semantically and perceptually associated lures is quite high. Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) reported that participants falsely remembered critical lures 55% of the time—the 
exact same recall rate for words presented in the middle of the list! Similar effects have 
been reported in recognition tests of previously studied lists (Underwood, 1965), with 
participants falsely recognizing both synonyms and antonyms of previously studied 
words as having been in the list up to 30% of the time. Importantly, when the recognition 
list involves semantically related words, the false alarm rate can reach up to 70% (Payne 
et al., 1996). Finally, semantic intrusions have also been reported in experimental 
paradigms using sentences, showing that, under certain conditions, participants may 
report having heard an entire sentence that was not included in the original study set 
(Bransford et al., 1972). 
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In addition to words and sentences, psychologists have shown that people are 
prone to misremember perceptual details of previously witnessed events, and even entire 
events that never happened in their lives, but which people tend to recall as though they 
did. One of the most celebrated studies in eye witness suggestibility was conducted by 
Loftus in 1975. This study pioneers the use of the misinformation paradigm, which 
shows that people tend to report false memories when they receive misleading 
information during recall. Loftus presented participants with color slides depicting a car 
accident. The slides showed a car failing to stop at a traffic sign. Half of the participants 
were shown a slide with a ‘stop’ sign while the other half were shown a slide with a 
‘yield’ sign. Twenty minutes after the slide show, participants received a 20-question 
interview, with the 17th question being the critical one. Half of the subjects that were 
shown the slide with the stop sign were asked if the car had failed to stop at the ‘stop’ 
sign, whereas the other half of that group were asked if the car had failed to stop at the 
‘yield’ sign (the same occurred with the subjects that were shown the yield sign). The 
results were striking: on average, participants were unable to discriminate the correct 
answer. Even when subjects were told, before receiving the interview, that some of the 
questions may have stated the traffic sign incorrectly, participants still chose the correct 
sign only 43% of the time—versus 67% for those who were not misled (a remarkable 
result in itself, as it implies that participants chose the wrong answer 33% of the time 
even with no misinformation at all). In a follow up study varying the lag time between 
the stimulus and the misleading interview, Loftus and collaborators (1978) discovered 
that when the interview was administered 20 minutes after witnessing the event, 
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participants were correct about 40% of the time, but if the interview is administered one 
week after witnessing the event, the rate dropped to 18%.  
Psychologists have also tested the misinformation paradigm using real-life 
autobiographical material, showing that people can misremember entire events that did 
not happen in their lives as though they did. Loftus and Pickrell (1995) showed that up to 
25% of study participants would falsely remember having been lost in a shopping mall 
when they were children if they receive misleading information during suggestive 
interviews. Hyman (1995) showed the same effect for more unusual—although not 
implausible—events, like having been hospitalized or having had a party with clowns. 
More recently, Lindsay et al. (2004) used a variation of the misinformation paradigm 
involving doctored photographs. After seeing the photographs, 56% of participants 
falsely recalled experiencing an event (e.g., taking a trip in an air balloon) that they 
actually never experienced. The effects of the misinformation paradigm are related to 
those of the so-called imagination inflation effect, which shows that people tend to 
falsely remember an event as a result of having imagined what it would have been like to 
experience it prior to being asked to recall it. In one of the most telling demonstrations of 
this effect, Garry and collaborators (1996) randomly divided their participants into two 
groups. All participants were told that they were taking part in a study measuring their 
capacity to imagine counterfactual events with as much detail as possible. Two weeks 
later, the same participants were called back, this time to participate in an 
autobiographical recognition test. They were asked to state how sure they were that 
certain events did not happen in their lives. Half of the subjects were presented with 
events they had previously imagined; the other half were only presented with novel 
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events. Surprisingly, the confidence ratings for events that were previously imagined 
were substantially lower than for those that were new. In other words, participants were 
more confident saying that events they did not previously imagine definitely did not 
happen in their lifetime than they were saying that the events they had previously 
imagined definitely did not happen. Importantly, participants did not remember having 
imagined any of the critical events before (a phenomenon known as source amnesia). 
So far, I have presented evidence suggesting that false memories are a normal 
occurrence in healthy individuals. Another piece of evidence in favor of this claim comes 
from studies probing the effects on memory-related tasks in subjects with episodic 
memory deficits. In a pioneer study, Schacter and collaborators (1996) endeavored to find 
out whether individuals with selectively impaired memory were more prone to 
misremembering than healthy subjects, a result that would lend credence to the view that 
false and distorted memories are the product of a faulty memory. They used the DRM 
paradigm on subjects with amnesia caused by medial-temporal lobe accidents. They 
discovered that individuals with amnesia showed significantly reduced false recognition 
of semantically and perceptually associated lures. Even though they were less accurate 
than controls overall, amnesiacs were significantly less likely to produce false alarms 
than controls (Melo et al., 1999; Ciaramelli et al., 2006). Other studies using visual 
shapes have revealed equivalent effects in amnesiacs, showing that the number of 
pictorial memory intrusions is significantly reduced relative to healthy controls 
(Koutstaal et al., 1999). Finally, similar studies with patients in the early stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease—a neuropathology that usually begins at the medial-temporal 
lobes—have shown that, compared with age-matched controls, individuals with 
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Alzheimer’s also present reduced false recognition rates (Balota et al., 1999; Budson 
2003).  
Taken together, these—and many similar—studies suggest several conclusions. 
First, they tell us that false and distorted memories are a common phenomenon. Second, 
they suggest that even though many of our ordinary memory experiences may be false 
recollections, entertaining those false memories not only does not affect us: we do not 
even notice if they are false memories. Third, the fact that individuals with memory-
related pathologies tend to entertain less false and distorted memories than normal 
subjects, suggests that some degree of memory distortion may be non-pathological, and 
perhaps even beneficial. These studies also show that not all kinds of information are 
susceptible to being misremembered or are likely to implant false memories. False and 
distorted memories have an air of plausibility to them. One may falsely remember having 
experienced an episode from a distance, as it occurs with observer memories. Even 
though this in and of itself is strange, it may not be altogether implausible if one had been 
able to adopt someone else’s point of view at the time. Similarly, having been lost in a 
shopping mall as a child, having a neighbor call 911 to complain about the noise, or 
having seen the word ‘sleep’ in a list of sleep-related words, are all plausible things that 
could have happened, at least in the sense of being more plausible than being abducted by 
talking unicorns, having the Beatles play at your sixth birthday party, or having seen the 
word ‘multiplication’ or ‘vomit’ in a list that otherwise contains words semantically 
related to fruits (Psychologists call this feature schema-consistency, meaning that false 
memories are consistent with schematic forms of the events they falsely portray. I discuss 
this issue further below). So the question is: how can the traditional view defend the 
 113 
claim that false memories are the product of a malfunctioning faculty in the face of their 
pervasiveness and regularity? Furthermore: why would we have a cognitive system that 
malfunctions so constantly and so systematically? The answer may be that the function of 
memory is not to reproduce previous perceptions with the fidelity demanded by the 
traditional view. But then, how can we safeguard the obvious intuition that we use our 
memory to remember while accounting for the prevalence and regularity of our false 
memories? 
In what follows I offer an answer to these questions. But first, let me summarize 
the main points of this first section. According to the traditional view, the function of 
memory is to remember, and remembering is thought of as the act of reproducing 
previous experiences with mental representations that preserve the structure of the 
original perceptions. As such, false memories occur when you deploy a mental 
representation whose content, although it is experienced as a memory, does not preserve 
the structure of any previous perceptual experience. From the traditional point of view, a 
false memory is understood as either the product of a cognitive mechanism other than 
memory (imagination) or as the product of memory malfunction. I argued that the first 
alternative forces us to say that some bona fide cases of remembering are not memories at 
all. The second route is also undesirable, for it makes it hard to understand why evolution 
would have favored a cognitive mechanism that malfunctions so regularly. In order to 
avoid these unwanted consequences, I argue we need to reconsider the way in which we 
think about cognitive functions. 
 
3. Thinking about cognitive functions 
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The conclusion of the preceding discussion lends itself to an obvious objection. 
Even though most biological systems—cognitive and otherwise—tend to perform their 
functions regularly, there are many traits that malfunction frequently. However, functions 
are not statistically determined; the function of a system isn’t necessarily equivalent to 
the role the system usually performs. A system may perform its normal function only 
rarely, when very specific conditions obtain—presumably the very conditions under 
which it contributed to the reproductive success of the organism’s ancestors (Millikan, 
1984)—but such infrequency does not license us to say that the system’s function is not 
its normal one. Consequently, the fact that memory frequently malfunctions does not 
imply that it is not for remembering. 
 I think this objection can be put to rest, however. Consider two classic examples 
of allegedly frequently malfunctioning biological systems. Meerkats evolved an alarm 
call system for identifying predators. Nowadays, with fewer predators, their alarm system 
tends to produce more false alarms on average than it did in the past. However, the 
relative frequency at which it misfires does not take away from the fact that, given the 
circumstances in which it evolved, it was a highly reliable indicator of predators22. As a 
result, one can still say that the function of the system is to identify predators even if it 
regularly malfunctions. The second example is closer to home. Humans evolved 
particular cognitive strategies known as heuristics for quickly assessing the probability of 
certain events happening. One such strategy is the availability heuristic, according to 
which the relative facility with which information is made available to our conscious 
experience influences our perception of how probable an event may be. This is because 
                                                
22 The relationship between false alarms and predator population needn’t be linear. It may be possible that 
false alarms also increase when there is an excessive number of predators. Still, the point I am about to 
make holds even in this hypothetical situation.   
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conscious availability tends to track frequency, which in turn tends to track probability. 
However, nowadays we face many situations in which the most probable event is not 
necessarily the one we have experienced as more frequent. As a result, when facing these 
situations, most people’s judgments tend to align with our evolved heuristics, and thus 
produce the wrong judgments. But the fact that our judgments of probability so 
frequently lead us astray does not speak against the claim that the function of the 
cognitive systems with which we produce such judgments is to track the probability of 
events happening. 
 There are two crucial differences between these cases and memory which speak 
against taking false memories merely as instances of a frequently malfunctioning system. 
First, whereas in the case of the alarm call and the heuristic systems there is an 
identifiable change in circumstances responsible for the shift in the system’s reliability, 
the same does not seem to happen with our memory system. The frequency of false 
alarms in the meerkat’s alarm system varies as a function of the proportion of predators 
in the environment relative to other non-threatening objects that could trigger it. 
Likewise, in environments in which the most probable events are also those experienced 
as being the most frequent, our heuristic systems are reliable. When the most probable 
events aren’t those experienced as the most frequent, our heuristic systems are not 
reliable. This change in circumstances is not apparent when it comes to the case of 
memory. The circumstances under which our memory system evolved are not 
significantly different from the circumstances in which we currently deploy it—or at least 
there is no particular circumstantial change that would have made memory evidently less 
reliable than it supposedly was. In fact, there may not be a particular feature of our 
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ancestor’s environment whose change relative to our current environment shifted the 
conditions of reliability of our memory system. 
The second crucial difference between these systems and memory is that the 
functional explanations of both the alarm call and the heuristic systems assume, rightly, 
that their purportedly correct functioning—identifying predators or probable events—is 
more beneficial than their malfunctioning. But the same assumption isn’t warranted for 
the case of memory, as it is not obvious that a faithful reproduction of an experienced 
event is more beneficial than a relatively distorted reconstruction. Indeed, the exact 
opposite claim may actually be closer to the truth—namely that low rather than high 
fidelity in memory may provide us with a selective advantage. Psychologists Suddendorf 
and Corballis (2007) argue that memory systems contribute to the organism’s fitness 
insofar as they allow it to recast knowledge of particular events that happened in the past 
in order to foresee what may happen in the future. They review a wide array of 
comparative studies in both human and non-human animals, and they conclude that 
successful anticipatory behavior is correlated with the degree of flexibility one’s memory 
has to rearrange stored information. However, they also show that this flexibility 
demands relatively imprecise memory representations. This last idea, first proposed by 
Bartlett in 1932, is rapidly gaining popularity in contemporary cognitive science. 
Cognitive neuroscientists Daniel Schacter and Donna Addis (2007) suggest that 
considering the conditions upon which cognitive organisms like us live, encoding 
relatively sketchy or “gist-like representations” of previous experiences may be more 
advantageous. The thought is that, since we live in an informationally rich and constantly 
changing environment, and since there is a strict limit to the informational load we can 
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operate with at each time, both literal encoding and recall may become burdensome and 
risky (Bartlett 1932, 204). So, in order to respond quickly while saving storage space, our 
brains opt for a rather schematic way of encoding information.23  
This line of thought lends itself to a tempting but ultimately wrong interpretation. 
According to this interpretation, the fidelity of memory would be cost effective, in the 
sense that in informationally rich environments faithful encoding becomes too costly, so 
memory opts for more gist-like representations of experienced events. In contrast, in 
informationally poor environments, memory can afford higher fidelity, so it encodes 
memories in ways that produce less distortion during recall. This possibility would 
preserve the view that memory is indeed for remembering, as memory distortions are 
simply the side effect of the elevated cost of high fidelity.24 The problem with this 
interpretation is that it is hard to make sense of many of the experimental results 
discussed above in which false and distorted memories occurred in informationally poor 
environments where the stakes are pretty low—paradigmatically in psychology labs in 
which only short movies or brief word lists are presented. The amount of information 
                                                
23 A neat piece of evidence in support of the claim that distorted rather than faithful memory representations 
are more advantageous, would be to find out whether people who experience no memory distortion exhibit 
behaviors that are clearly less advantageous than those exhibited by people who normally experience 
memory distortions. There are several reasons why this piece of evidence is hard to gather in practice. For 
one, as I mentioned, false and distorted memories are prevalent and pervasive, to the extent that everybody 
seems susceptible to experience them. A longitudinal study comparing two groups in these two conditions 
would probably be impossible. An attractive alternative would be looking at specific populations. There are 
at least two possible populations from which to draw samples for a longitudinal study testing this 
hypothesis: patients with retrograde amnesia and individuals with hyperthymestic syndrome, a condition in 
which individuals appear unable to forget episodic details of their day-to-day lives. Multiple studies have 
been conducted with amnesic patients which, unsurprisingly, have a hard time getting around in the world. 
Some of these results will be covered shortly. But the second population remains understudied—partly 
because hyperthymestic syndrome is not only recent but also controversial. This, I believe, is a fecund line 
for future research. 
 
24 Contrast this interpretation with the case of the meerkat’s alarm system. In the case of the meerkats, it 
looks as though the cost of a false alarm is significantly lower than the cost of missing a predator. 
Similarly, under this interpretation, the cost of producing distortions is significantly lower that the cost of 
encoding experiences with high fidelity. 
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participants experience in these environments is significantly lower than the amount of 
information one normally experiences in every-day situations. Therefore, since memory 
distortions are so general and frequent in these informationally poor environments, the 
idea of memory’s fidelity as a function of the environment’s informational richness loses 
its footing.  
A better alternative, I contend, is to interpret the frequency of memory distortions 
not as a cost the system has to pay in exchange for efficacy, but rather as the beneficial 
byproduct of a mechanism that is actually doing something else. But, what could memory 
be for if not remembering? The answer to this question, I believe, requires a change of 
perspective as to how to determine the function of a cognitive system such as memory. 
As I mentioned, the traditional view follows a content-based approach, which consists of 
looking at the way in which the information processed by a cognitive function is 
experienced by the subject, and then going on to say that the mechanism responsible for 
those experiences must be there for that purpose. Thus, since memories are experienced 
as reproductions of previous experiences, the content-based approach recommends 
thinking of memory’s function as that of reproducing previous experiences. However, 
there is no principled reason for us to pursue this approach. The way in which a particular 
mental content is experienced by us is orthogonal to the purpose of the system that is 
responsible for providing us with such an experience. Mental contents and purposes may 
or may not coincide, but there is no necessary connection between them. Perception, for 
instance, may be for guiding action (Noe, 2004), even if the content one is conscious of 
when perceiving is not experienced as such. Similarly, in the case of memory, all we 
know is that the way the contents of our memories are experienced by us is something 
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that memory does—and, as such, it is something one should expect to be accounted for 
once we have a adequate functional analysis of its operations—but it need not be what 
memory is for.  
In order to find out what memory may actually be for, I suggest we look at it in 
terms of its contribution to cognitive organisms such as ourselves. Philosophers typically 
distinguish two general approaches to understand how a system contributes to an 
organism. The first approach is etiological. It consists in analyzing the function of a 
system in terms of its evolutionary history (e.g., Millikan, 1984). The second approach, 
which we may call the role function approach, consists in analyzing what something is 
for in terms of its contribution to the organism qua biological system (Cummins, 1975; 
1983). Although both approaches are complementary—what one says about a system’s 
contribution to the containing organism must also make evolutionary sense (Godfrey-
Smith, 1994)—my objective here aligns more with the second approach. Specifically, I 
want to consider memory as a cognitive mechanism whose function is determined by the 
activities with which it contributes to the overall goals of the containing cognitive 
organism (see Machamer et al., 2000; Craver, 2000). As such, if we think of cognitive 
organisms like humans in terms of our overarching goals—survival, for instance—
memory’s “mechanistic role function” (Craver, 2000: 61) would be its contribution 
toward that goal. Thus understood, the task we face now is that of determining what the 
mechanistic role function of our memory system may be.  
  Explanations of mechanistic role functions are thought to be hierarchical. This is 
not at all a new idea. It is the backbone of what functionalist philosophers called 
“functional analysis”; that is, the idea that the mind could be decomposed into 
 120 
hierarchical computational levels until it bottoms out at the ultimate level of 
implementation. What is novel about the functional mechanistic role approach, however, 
is that it tries to spell out what it means for a mechanism to carry out a function at a 
particular level of the hierarchy. Thus, in order to determine the mechanistic role function 
of a particular cognitive system, S, one needs, first, to determine the way in which the 
mechanisms of the immediately lower level contribute to S’s functioning, and, second, 
how S contributes to the proper functioning of the mechanism at the immediately superior 
level. However, in so doing, we may end up with something that the traditional functional 
analysis did not foresee (except, perhaps, for Lycan, 1988: 31-32): we may have been just 
wrong about the mind. More precisely: we may end up discovering that the mechanistic 
role function of a certain cognitive system does not square with our folk psychological 
characterization of its alleged function. Successful functional analyses may reveal that the 
hierarchical organization of the mechanisms carrying out the computations underlying 
our mental processes might not constitute a smooth linear transition from mind talk to 
brain talk. Bechtel makes this point quite clearly when he says that,  
 
The decomposition of mental life into activities such as perception, memory, and 
decision making provided the takeoff point for the development of cognitive 
accounts of the mind. […] One of the most potent contributions of the attempt to 
localize memory and other activities in the brain may be the realization that such 
decompositions may not reflect how the brain organizes its functioning. When a 
variety of mental operations have been convincingly identified and localized in the 
appropriate brain areas, it may turn out that the characterization of the operations 
are orthogonal to these long-standing categories of mental phenomena. (Bechtel, 
2008: 82). 
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I believe this is precisely what happens with memory. According to its mechanistic role, 
remembering does not seem to be what memory is for, as remembering appears to be a 
sub-routine of a larger and more complex operation—or so I argue in the next section.  
  To review, in the first section I argued that the traditional view cannot account for 
recent evidence in the cognitive psychology and neuroscience of false memory, unless we 
are willing to accept one of two unappealing consequences: either that some genuine 
cases of remembering are not the product of memory or that it is adaptive to have a 
memory system that frequently and regularly malfunctions. This last alternative left open 
the possibility of thinking of memory as a system that indeed evolved to perform the 
function of remembering, but that like other adaptive traits that frequently malfunction, 
under new circumstances it regularly produces false and distorted memories. In this 
second section I argued against this possibility by noting, first, that the relevant 
circumstances under which our memory system evolved are not significantly different 
from those in which we currently deploy it and, second, that empirical evidence suggests 
that some degree of memory distortion appears to be more adaptive than faithful 
reproductions of previous events. I suggested, then, that our failed attempts to safeguard 
the traditional view may be rooted in a false methodological assumption: the content-
based approach. I recommended pursuing an alternative approach—the mechanistic-role 
function approach—according to which the function of a cognitive system is determined 
by the way in which the mechanism that instantiates the system contributes to the overall 
goals of the containing organism. In the next and final section I explain how, when seen 
from the point of view of its mechanistic-role function, memory is not for remembering, 
but rather for recombining pieces of memory traces into mental representations of what 
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could have happened in our past in the service of creating optimal predictions of what 
could happen in our future. This perspective will dispel the unwanted consequences 
unveiled in the first section by explaining why ordinary cases of false and distorted 
memories aren’t the product of a faulty mechanism, but rather the appropriate result of 
the same underlying process that produces veridical memories. 
 
4. Remembering what could have happened.  
  As I mentioned above, there are two parts to understanding the mechanistic role 
function of a system: one needs to understand how the mechanisms that compose such a 
system work, and also how the system contributes to the functioning of the larger system 
that contains it. Cognitive neuroscience has managed to give a relatively accurate 
depiction of the mechanisms underlying recollection. I want to show now, by way of an 
example, the role of such mechanisms during an instance of ordinary false recollection. 
The purpose of this illustration is to make a case for the thesis that the mechanisms 
underlying the recollection of some false memories are identical to those underlying 
veridical remembering. From this illustration I will draw three morals regarding the 
nature of such mechanisms. I suggest that these features only make sense if we consider 
memory as a subroutine of a larger system whose function is not to reproduce past 
experiences, but rather to recombine them in order to entertain what I call episodic 
counterfactual thoughts. 
The example I have in mind echoes one of the false memory paradigms 
mentioned above (Loftus, 1975). Suppose you are driving and you witness a car accident. 
A red Datsun fails to stop at a ‘yield’ sign and hits the truck next to you. The event takes 
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no more than eight seconds. During that brief period of time, your attention is shifting 
everywhere. A large percentage of that time your attention is focused on stimuli relevant 
for your survival: the front of the car, the incoming vehicle, the wheel, the brake pedal. A 
smaller percentage is probably allocated to some perceptual details that call your 
attention on the basis of their biological relevance: the face of the driver, the color of the 
car, the sound of the tires on the road. The remaining percentage—probably a very small 
percentage—may be allocated to other details, like the words written on the traffic sign, 
or its particular shape. Anything else that was not attended was not processed by working 
memory. So, in addition to the unattended details, those that were not rehearsed in 
working memory because they exceeded its informational quota would not have been 
consolidated in long term memory. Only a small portion of the information that made it 
all the way through would be effectively encoded in long term memory, with its sensory 
components dispersed over the sensory cortex (viz., visual information about the event 
will be schematically stored in occipital areas, auditory information in dorsal temporal 
areas, semantic information in ventral temporal areas, etc.) This is the sense, I 
understand, in which Schacter and Addis (2007) talk of storing a gist-like 
representation.25  
Now suppose that, thirty minutes after you witnessed the accident, a policeman 
calls and asks you to remember whether the red Datsun failed to stop at the stop sign. 
During recall, your pre-frontal cortex—aided by the medial temporal lobes and the 
                                                
25 “Storing” is a rather misleading term. What seems to occur when we encode information is the 
strengthening of neural connections due to the co-activation of different regions of the brain, particularly in 
the sensory cortices, the medial temporal lobe, the superior parietal cortex, and the lateral prefrontal cortex. 
During encoding, each of these regions performs a different function depending on the moment in which 
the information gets processed. A memory trace is the dispositional property these regions have to re-
activate, when triggered by the right cue, in roughly the same pattern of activation they underwent during 
encoding. (See chapter 4). 
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superior temporal cortices (Shimamura, forthcoming; and chapter 4)—calls back the 
disaggregated sensory information stored in the neural connections engaged during the 
event perception (e.g., the color red, the sound of squealing tires, your bodily reaction, 
etc.). Since they are disaggregated, the act of recollection becomes the act of 
reconstructing disperse encoded information. However, given that not all the relevant 
information was effectively encoded, this reconstruction is more like trying to rebuild a 
dinosaur out of its fossilized remains (Neisser, 1967) than trying to put together a jigsaw 
puzzle of which you have all the pieces. Memory, therefore, must be the sort of 
mechanism that can not only bind together information that is distributed across neural 
networks, but must also be able to fill the gaps left by the missing pieces. Importantly, 
though, the process by means of which memory fills those gaps is not haphazard. On the 
contrary, recent work on computational models of cognition using parallel distributed 
networks has shown that, by inserting probabilistic constraints based on a prior 
optimization hypothesis constructed out of previous experiences with similar stimuli, one 
can replicate and even predict memory intrusions (for a classic attempt, McClelland, 
1995; for a more sophisticated one, Steyvers et al., 2006). The idea—to go back to the 
example—is that since you have had many similar experiences in comparable 
situations—i.e., with comparable cars and comparable traffic signs—your perceptual 
system has grown accustomed to receiving very specific kinds of visual information 
during perceptual events just like this one. As a result, the connection weights among the 
nodes of the neural network have been attuned to the probability of seeing ‘stop’ signs 
more often than ‘yield’ signs—or, for that matter, than gigantic lollipops. Your 
perception, therefore, does not need to attend to every detail of the stop sign when 
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encoding, since due to previous similar experiences it can optimize the process by filling 
the missing pieces according to probabilistic rules—think of the schema consistency 
effect mentioned above. In turn, memory takes advantage of this very same mechanism, 
and instead of storing an altogether new copy of the optimized visual stimulus, it simply 
creates an index—presumably in the parahippocampal cortex (Nadel & Moscovitch, 
1997)—that tells the brain which neural networks engaged during the original perceptual 
event need to be reactivated during recall. So it is no surprise that now that you are trying 
to remember the accident after having been cued by a related piece of auditory 
information that has been added to the process of recollection—namely the words “stop 
sign” said by the policeman—the reactivation of the sensory information brings to your 
mind an optimized mental representation of the event, which, thanks to your memory’s 
proper functioning, fills the gap left by the unattended spot with what it finds to be more 
likely: a visual image of a ‘stop’ sign. You have definitively misremembered the event, 
there is no question about that, but your memory mechanism was working just fine. 
There are three morals I would like to draw from this illustration. First, when I 
say that veridical and false memories are the workings of the same mechanism, I mean to 
imply that just as there are cases of false memories that are like cases of veridical 
memories, there are also cases of veridical memories that are like cases of false 
memories. Given that recollection is probabilistic in the sense suggested above, 
successful encoding just means increased probability of recall26. Therefore, a successful 
recall produced by reconstructing the optimal representation of an event given a cue 
                                                
26 This assertion is contentious but important. Memory traces or “engrams” do not have the ontological 
status of objects or events. They are dispositional properties of neural networks to elicit certain responses 
(see footnote 6). A similar idea can be found in the works of Semon (1909), Martin and Deutscher (1966), 
and more recently Tulving (2002).  
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would count as veridical recall even if some sensory details of the original stimulus were 
not attended. Attending to those details would increase the probability of successfully 
recalling them later on, of course, but since we cannot afford having every aspect of the 
world under the spotlight of attention, the next best solution is to have a system that can 
fill in the gaps with the optimal alternative it can come up with. Most of the time what 
you recall accurately depicts the witnessed event. Sometimes it doesn’t. In both cases, 
however, the system is doing what it is supposed to do. 
The second moral is that our memory system redeploys mechanisms that can be 
used for purposes other than recollection. As I pointed out, evidence shows that the same 
regions of the sensory cortex recruited during the perceptual processing of a particular 
event are later on reactivated during the recollection of the same event (e.g., Wheeler et 
al., 2000). This suggests that, depending on the cognitive task they are engaged in, these 
very regions are playing a different role. Similarly, the superior frontal gyrus, the superior 
parietal cortex and the hippocampal complex, all involved in episodic recollection, have 
shown to be actively engaged in several distinct cognitive tasks (Andersen et al., 2007). 
Indeed, the more we know about brain processes, the clearer it is that far from being an 
exception, massive redeployment of neural systems may actually be the rule (Anderson, 
2007; 2010). Consequently, a successful account of our memory system needs to be 
consistent with the way in which its components are redeployed for other cognitive tasks.  
Finally, the third and—for the purposes at hand—most relevant moral, is that our 
memory system employs a probabilistic strategy to recover information. This fact 
dovetails with one of the most interesting features unveiled by the research on false 
memory mentioned in the first part of this paper: most memory distortions are schema 
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consistent. When people misremember events—or mere details thereof—their false or 
distorted memories are usually about things that even though they did not happen—or did 
not happen exactly as they were misremembered—they, nonetheless, could have 
happened. This suggests that our memory system must be sensitive, not only to what 
indeed happened in our past, but also to what could have plausibly happened. How could 
this be? A reason for that, I suggest, is that the mechanisms underlying our episodic 
memory are contained within a larger system that supports episodic counterfactual 
thinking, that is, thoughts of what could happen in one’s future as well as what could 
have happened in one’s own past.  
Some initial evidence in support of this claim comes from cognitive neuroscience. 
Current studies of autobiographical episodic recollection reveal a striking structural 
parallelism between the brain structures recruited for episodic memory and future 
projection. In particular, recent evidence suggests a relation between remembering one’s 
past and imagining one’s future. Neuropsychological studies have shown that deficits in 
autobiographical episodic remembering are associated with deficits in people’s capacities 
to project themselves into the future. Evidence supporting this claim comes from research 
on amnesic subjects (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002; Hassabis et al., 2007), older adults 
with memory-related pathologies (Addis et al., 2009), patients with severe depression 
(Dickson & Bates, 2005; Williams et al., 1996), and subjects with schizophrenia 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2008). In addition, research in healthy individuals has shown that 
when certain phenomenonological features of our prospective thoughts are 
manipulated—e.g., vividness, emotional significance, etc.—the effects are very similar to 
those elicited by equivalent manipulations in autobiographical recollection 
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(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008). Finally, research 
using neuroimaging techniques has revealed a core brain network that is engaged during 
autobiographical remembering and future projection (Schacter et al., 2007; Addis & 
Schacter, 2008; Addis et al., 2007). This core brain network involves the hippocampus, 
the posterior cingulated/retrosplenial cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the medial 
prefrontal cortex, and the lateral temporal cortex. Importantly, this core brain network is 
not engaged when people are asked to imagine events that do not involve considerations 
of what could happen to them (as opposed to considerations of what could happen to 
other people) (Hassabis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007). Not all 
kinds of imagining, therefore, seem to be reliant on the same brain network. 
Further evidence in support of the claim that the same neural mechanisms 
engaged during episodic recollection are also recruited for thinking of what may happen, 
comes from recent behavioral and neurophysiological studies in non-human animals. 
Human-like episodic memory has been notoriously difficult to find in non-human 
animals. Surprisingly, however, recent studies in cognitive ethology and comparative 
psychology have come to a similar conclusion regarding the capacity of non-human 
animals to foresee future events. Although many animals exhibit future oriented 
behaviors, these are inflexible and most likely instinctual. Rats, for instance, continue to 
cache food in locations of the maze that have shown to damage the food in the past, as 
though they had little sense of what that location could do to new food in the future 
(McKenzie et al., 2005). Similarly, New Caledonian crows develop replenishment 
routines that are highly dependent on the regularities in food supply at different locations. 
However, they are incapable of breaking those routines in order to circumvent 
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environmental contingencies (Burke & Fulham, 2003). Finally, volumetric comparisons 
between ape and human brains confirm that critical regions of the brain core network—in 
particular, inferior pre-frontal cortex (BA 11 and 47) and the frontal pole (BA 10)27—are 
orders of magnitude larger in humans than in our closest non-human relatives (accounting 
for their encephalization quotient, a widely used ratio of brain weight to body weight. See 
Flinn et al., 2005). 
Taken together, these results lend strong credence to the view, suggested 
previously by Tulving (1985), that episodic autobiographical memory provides the basis 
for “mental time travel”: our ability to mentally travel back in time to relive past 
experiences and to mentally project ourselves onto the future in order to anticipate what 
may come. In turn, these results suggest that the same mechanisms recruited for thinking 
about what happened in our past are also responsible for our thinking about what may 
happen in our future. And since thoughts of what may happen in the future are a species 
of thoughts of what may happen, then this is at least initial evidence to the effect that the 
same mechanisms responsible for our capacity to think about what happened in our past 
may also subserve our capacity to think of what may happen in general.  
This particular view of episodic memory as “mental time travel” unveils an 
interesting asymmetry: whereas our recollection of an autobiographical memory is 
constrained by how the experienced facts actually were, prospective thought is not so 
constrained [Figure 4]. When we remember what happened to us on a particular occasion, 
                                                
27 This is an important piece of information for the inferior frontal and frontopolar cortex are preferentially 
engaged during episodic counterfactual thinking, i.e. our capacity to think about alternative outcomes to 
events that happened in our past (De Brigard et al., forthcoming).  
 
 
 
 130 
what comes to mind is determined by what we lived; any deviation from what we lived 
allegedly constitutes a false memory. However, when we think of ourselves in the future, 
there is no lived experience against which to contrast the content of our mental 
representation, and as a result the scope of possibilities that can be brought to mind isn’t 
determined by the facts. To put it simply: if this view of episodic memory as “mental 
time travel” is correct, there is only one way to mentally travel back to the past, but many 
ways to mentally travel into the future. Could it be possible that the same core network 
underlying recollection and prospection could also subserve episodic counterfactual 
thinking, i.e. thoughts about what could have happened in one’s own life?  
 
Figure 4: 
 
 
 
To test this possibility, my collaborators and I conducted a study in which 
participants were presented with alternative outcomes to events they experienced in their 
lives while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (De Brigard et al., 
forthcoming). In particular, using a variation on a paradigm previously employed for 
looking at the neural correlates of future thought, we asked participants to imagine what 
would have happened if the outcome of an experienced event would have been different 
than it was, either in a positive or a negative way. The results were striking. Thinking of 
 131 
what could have happened in the past but did not recruited most of the same regions that 
are engaged during autobiographical episodic recollection. Specifically, it engaged 
regions in superior and medial frontal gyrus, left inferior parietal lobule, middle occipital 
gyrus, cyngulate gyrus, claustrum and putamen. Importantly, many of these regions 
belong to the aforementioned core brain network, suggesting that the network not only 
enables episodic recollection and future projection but also episodic counterfactual 
thinking. These results are of a piece with previous interpretations of the brain core 
network according to which its function is to enable us to perform cognitive tasks 
involving self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). But since thoughts of self-projection 
are also a species of episodic counterfactual thought, it may be more natural to think of 
the brain core network as being engaged in thoughts of what could happen to us either in 
the possible past—with our actual past being an actualized version of a possible past—or 
in the possible future [Figure 5]. 
 
Figure 5: 
 
 
 
Where do we stand on the issue of the function of memory? The evidence 
reviewed suggests that the mechanisms underlying our episodic memory system are 
integrated within a larger system that supports thoughts of what could happen to us in the 
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future as well as what could have happened to us in the past. Remembering, therefore, 
should be understood merely as a particular operation of a system whose function is to 
enable us to entertain episodic counterfactual thoughts. This implies that it is a mistake to 
think that ‘memory’ refers to a system uniquely dedicated to reproducing the contents of 
previous experiences. What we normally call ‘memory’, and what many have tended to 
reify as an independent system, is a misnomer for a particular subset of operations carried 
out by a larger system that supports episodic counterfactual thoughts.  
Thinking of memory in this mechanistic way can help us explain the phenomena 
that the traditional view could not accommodate. Veridical memories are produced by an 
underlying probabilistic mechanism. When we try to recall an event, this mechanism 
reconstructs an optimized mental representation from the encoded perceptual information 
according to probabilistic constraints dictated by previous experiences. As such, 
successfully encoded perceptual information is more likely to be remembered than 
information that wasn’t successfully encoded. However, most of the time, due to 
informational limits on both perception and working memory, we fail to encode several 
informational details. Fortunately, memory’s probabilistic nature fills in the missing 
information according to the very same optimization algorithms that it would have 
followed had the information actually been encoded. As a result, when unattended 
information deviates from what would have been its optimal reconstruction, the 
recollection of the event would likely yield a misrepresentation of what indeed happened. 
This is precisely what occurs with the boundary extension effect. We tend to experience 
middle-size objects from angles that allow us to fully see them. When we are presented 
with objects missing their boundaries and we fail to focus our attention in their missing 
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frontiers, we will tend to recall them from the point of view from which we would have 
normally experienced them, i.e. a wider angle. A similar explanation is available for the 
misinformation paradigm. During episodic retrieval, reconstructed memory traces are 
vulnerable to the conditions of recall. If you hear or see a cue while retrieving, that cue 
could influence the ongoing process of probabilistic reconstruction, so that it may come 
to fill the gap left by a tenuously encoded initial perception.  
On the other hand, the fact that memory is an integral part of a larger system 
supporting episodic counterfactual thought also helps explain the fact that sometimes we 
remember things from an observer perspective. After all, observer memories are always 
perceived from the perspective one could have had—had one been an observer of the 
event. A contrived counterfactual, no doubt, but not implausible—especially not if we 
consider the fact that the brain core network is also engaged during tasks requiring theory 
of mind, i.e. adopting someone else’s point of view (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). This 
model also helps explain why amnestic individuals tend to produce proportionately fewer 
distortions and false memories than their healthier counterparts. If my picture of the 
neuroanatomical underpinnings of the memory mechanism is roughly correct, the anterior 
regions of the hippocampus would permit the flexible recombination of the perceptual 
components encoded in the sensory cortex. As a result, an atrophy in the medial-temporal 
lobes would render binding those pieces together impossible, which in turn would make it 
impossible to reconstruct both veridical and distorted memories. From this perspective, 
then, amnestics haven’t lost their memory, but their capacity to bind together previously 
acquired information into plausible episodes that may or may not have happened in the 
past or that may or may not happen in the future. Finally, the model I am suggesting 
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helps explain the phenomenon of imagination inflation. The sorts of things that people 
tend to misremember after having imagined them are highly plausible. People 
misremember having seen a stop sign, but they don’t misremember having dated a 
celebrity. And when they do—and only when they do—we may be able to say that their 
memory is malfunctioning (as it occurs in the case of confabulation), but the same 
conclusion isn’t always warranted when it comes to more quotidian cases of false and 
distorted memories.  
Let me conclude by summarizing the main points of this last section. After 
arguing against the necessity of pursuing a content-based approach to analyze the 
function of memory, I weighed in favor of a mechanistic-role function approach. 
According to this perspective, in order to understand the function of a cognitive system 
like memory, one needs to understand both the mechanisms of which it is composed as 
well as the larger system that contains it. I then showed how the mechanisms underlying 
memory behave according to probabilistic strategies for filling in incomplete memory 
traces following optimization constraints. As a result, many ordinary false and distorted 
memories are the appropriate product of the same underlying probabilistic mechanism 
that produces veridical memories. That the brain follows this strategy could be 
interpreted merely as a tradeoff it has to make in order to balance accuracy and 
efficiency. According to this interpretation, just as meerkats evolved an alarm system that 
traded on reliability for the sake of efficiency, memory could be seen as a system that 
trades on accuracy for the sake of efficiency by storing gist-like representations later to 
be filled in probabilistically. Consequently, memory could still be seen as being for 
remembering, as false and distorted memories are merely by-products of this tradeoff. 
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However, I argued against this interpretation by noting, first, that memory distortions 
seem to be inversely correlated with forecasting, which is presumably an adaptive trait. I 
then argued that people show equal rates of memory distortion in informationally rich 
environments as they show in informationally poor environments. Finally, I argued that 
memory is integrated into a larger cognitive system that allows us to entertain thoughts of 
what could happen to us in the future by way of flexibly recombining perceptual 
components of previous experiences into episodic counterfactual thoughts. As a result, 
memory distortions are not the undesired by-products of an imperfect system, but rather 
the natural effects of a healthy cognitive system that is constantly using stored 
information to rehearse alternative pasts in order to discipline our thoughts about what 
may happen in the future. Thus, from a mechanistic-role point of view, remembering 
becomes simply a particular operation of a system whose actual function is to enable us 
to entertain episodic counterfactual thoughts. Lastly, I contend that this view, if correct, 
should dispel the unwanted consequences produced by our commitment to the traditional 
view of the function of memory. In particular, it permits us to keep the intuition that 
when we falsely remember we are actually exercising our memory while allowing us to 
make sense of the pervasiveness of false and distorted memories without having to 
consider them as the product of a malfunctioning mechanism.  
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